



# **Measuring State-Business Relations in Sub-Saharan Africa<sup>A</sup>**

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## ABSTRACT

While many factors contribute to economic growth in a measurable way, this paper suggests that an effective state-business relationship (SBR) is one important underlying factor whose contribution has so far been difficult to measure. Effective SBRs lead to a more optimal allocation of resources in the economy, including an increased effectiveness of government involvement in supporting private sector activities and removing obstacles. SBRs are linked to the literature on good governance and while being part of the governance literature, effective SBRs may also *lead to* and *prioritise* governance reforms. In-depth discussions of state-business relations have so far been largely limited to Asian countries such as Korea, Taiwan, Japan, Malaysia, Bangladesh and Thailand; measurement of state-business relations for sub-Saharan African countries has been patchy or absent.

The aim of this paper is to measure the key factors associated with effective SBRs for 20 sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries over the period 1970–2005. The key factors were based on theory and practice: an organised private sector vis-à-vis the public sector, an organised public sector vis-à-vis the private sector, an institutionalised mechanism of SBR, and absence of harmful collusive behaviour. We scored the 20 SSA countries over time on the basis of these factors and calculated a composite SBR time series for each country.

The new measure of SBR seems plausible: first, higher scores are associated with faster growth (though more precise regression work will be done in a second phase); secondly, the new measures correlate well with other governance indicators; and thirdly, they correlate with more operational investment climate data, such as fewer procedures when trading goods and services.

We suggest two ways forward: first, we need to measure the impact of SBR on economic performance using macro and micro level data, taking into account other causes of growth; we will undertake this in the next stage. Secondly, we need further detailed descriptions of state-business relations across African countries over time – for instance, there does not seem to be a simple correlation between a high SBR score and perceived effectiveness of the association (based on micro-level data), so this needs further attention. Going into further detail will enable us to measure more specificities of state-business relations and therefore evaluate which specific circumstances are associated with effective SBRs.

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## 1. INTRODUCTION

Many factors contribute to economic growth in a measurable way, but the underlying drivers are more difficult to measure. This paper suggests that an effective state-business relationship (SBR) is an important underlying factor that drives a more optimal allocation of resources in the economy, including an increased effectiveness of government involvement in supporting private sector activities and removing obstacles. The aim is to measure the key factors associated with effective SBRs for 20 sub-Saharan African countries over the period 1970–2005.

It is important to consider SBRs as underlying drivers of growth, because effective SBRs are likely to improve economic performance. This can be argued as follows: first, a role exists for the state because of the presence of market and co-ordination failures in allocating resources efficiently (e.g. firms underinvest in general worker skills due to a failure to appropriate the benefits), (see te Velde and Morrissey<sup>1</sup>); important market failures include co-ordination failures which are often dynamic in nature. However, government and institutional failures are also prevalent (e.g. technology institutions in developing countries are often de-linked from what the private sector actually wants), and states often do not have the capacity to intervene and transform an economy, see Khan.<sup>2</sup> Hence, *appropriate* government capacity and policy is necessary to support the private sector, which can be enabled by good state-business relations (e.g. by matching and co-ordinating supply and demand in the market for skills).

The discussion on effective SBRs is linked to the literature on good governance.<sup>3</sup> The term governance can be confusing and can mean very different things: it can refer to policy networks, public management, co-ordination of economic sectors, public-private partnerships, and corporate governance. Major donor countries advocate a 'good governance' approach, characterised by four aspects: (1) the rule of law, (2) predictability, (3) transparency, and (4) accountability. This governance structure assumes that the government needs to be fully accountable and needs to provide a sound institutional environment in which a rational private sector maximises profits; an agenda is broad in principle. Others suggest the use of the term 'good enough governance' which focuses on minimal conditions of governance necessary to allow political and economic development to occur,<sup>4</sup> while Khan points to the importance of *feasible* reforms. Effective SBRs, being part of the governance literature itself, may also *lead to* and *prioritise* governance reforms.

In-depth discussions of state-business relations have so far been largely limited to Asian countries such as Korea, Japan, Malaysia, Bangladesh and Thailand;<sup>5</sup> the measurement of state-business relations in sub-Saharan Africa is nearly absent, despite its potential importance for economic development. Hyden et al. focus on 6 governance categories of which economic society is one; this includes (deliberately) subjective questions covering perceptions of state-business relations, over several developing – but only two African – countries. The Kaufman indicators have become frequently used, but are also about perceptions of governance variables such as government effectiveness and rule of law.<sup>6</sup> Finally, while investment climate measures in the World Bank's *Doing Business Reports* are objective (e.g. number of procedures to obtain a licence) these are unlikely to be fundamental drivers of economic performance (in fact there is little theory surrounding regulation and development), and can rather be seen as outcomes of effective state-business relations. There is therefore, a lack of descriptions and comprehensive measurement of SBRs as potentially fundamental drivers of economic growth in sub-Saharan Africa – this paper tries to fill this gap. At a later stage we will assess the effects of different types of SBRs on economic performance in SSA countries.

The structure of this paper is as follows: section 2 reviews the importance of effective SBR, why they have the potential to promote the private sector, and what constitutes effective SBRs; section 3 suggests how to measure SBRs; section 4 provides the empirical evidence for 20 sub-Saharan African countries from 1970 to 2005, and creates a new governance indicator, with country specific information in Appendix B; the new indicator is analysed in Section 5; and section 6 concludes.

## 2. STATE-BUSINESS RELATIONS AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE

### 2.1 Why markets alone fail to achieve an optimal allocation of resources

Monopoly, interdependence of economic actors external to the market mechanism, public goods and common resources are general causes of market failure; there are also several examples of market failures in private sector development, in the area of capital, skills, technological development and crucially in the co-ordination amongst them.

1. te Velde, D.W., and Morrissey, O. (2005) 'Supporting industrial development: overcoming market failures and providing public goods'. Report to UNIDO.
2. Khan, M. (2002) 'State Failure in Developing Countries and Strategies of Industrial Form'. Draft paper.
3. Hyden, G.J. Court and Maese, K. (2004) *Making Sense of Governance: Empirical Evidence from Sixteen Developing Countries*. Boulder, Co.: Lynne Rienner.
4. Grindle, M. (2004) 'Good enough governance: poverty reduction and reform in developing countries'. *Governance*, Vol. 17, pp. 525–548.
5. Hisahiro, K. (2005) 'Comparative Analysis of Governance: Relationship between Bureaucracy and Policy Co-operation Capacity with Particular Reference to Bangladesh'. Institute for International Co-operation.
6. Kaufmann, D.; Kraay, A.; and Mastruzzi, M. (2005) 'Governance Matters IV: Governance Indicators for 1996–2004'. Draft paper.

**Technological development:** the process of technological development is associated with market failures in innovative activity and identification, and adoption of new technology. These market failures centre on the externalities of the learning process and the public goods aspects of technological knowledge<sup>7</sup>: firstly, uncertainty and externalities among early users learning about the application of the new technology, while acquiring information, is costly to obtain and appropriate for individual firms; secondly, the codification and standardisation of experience and knowledge can offer social benefits in that they permit rapid diffusion of the technology as well as knowledge about it, but individual firms will not be able to appropriate all benefits of developing a new standard; finally, network externalities arise when new users of technology depend on the existence of a large user and support staff base.

**Skill formation:** the following instances of market failures in the education and training system are common<sup>8</sup>: the *trainee* may: not recoup all benefits of educational investments; not be aware of future values and future need for certain educational investments; be excessively risk averse; lack access to certified training; and not access capital markets. *Firms* lack knowledge of best-practices in training and lack full appropriability of benefits of investing in transferable worker skills. The *education and training system itself* can lack information on educational needs in industry; and lack access to capital markets to fund the development of better standards.

**Capital market imperfections:** perfect capital markets will lend surpluses of savings to those with skills, talents and ideas for profitable projects; however, the market is associated with credit constraints caused by uncertainty surrounding the (future) profitability of projects, on which basis lenders determine the probability of repayments of their funds. High transactions costs arising from screening, monitoring and enforcement in the credit market create obstacles to lenders. The use of collateral might reduce such need for screening, monitoring and enforcement and hence reduce transactions costs; however, poor people, informal firms, small firms and start-ups may not be able to pledge capital or formal title rights to land and houses as collateral – this prevents them from financing profitable projects.

**Co-ordination failures:** co-ordination failures go beyond the static market failures and from crucial impediments to transforming economies into high-growth performers. Co-ordination failures operate between linked firms, in clusters of firms and relating to the economy as a whole. The failure of co-ordinating capacity amongst economic agents might prevent an economy from reaching a higher development path; countries can get stuck in a low-level equilibrium due to the nature of technology and markets, even when government policy does not penalise normal private sector activities.<sup>9</sup> An often-mentioned example of co-ordination failure is that between training systems and technological development<sup>10</sup>; another example is taken from the new trade theory. Without active co-ordination of human resources and investor needs, countries with few skills would be trapped in a low skill–low growth cycle, after opening up to investment<sup>11</sup> and trade<sup>12</sup> because of uneven specialisation; this requires a consistent, strategic and market friendly human resource policy designed with the help of appropriate government capacities, though Khan (2002) argues that state capacities to encourage technology acquisitions have had little attention so far.

## 2.2 Why government involvement may fail to correct market failures

Despite a strong theoretical case for intervention or a co-ordinating role, public support may fail to correct market failures for several reasons: first, governments are unlikely to have perfect information and perfect foresight, which is needed to identify and overcome market failures; second, government intervention can suffer from moral hazard problems<sup>13</sup> in that the private sector may not act once the government has provided an incentive; third, there can be private non-market means that can solve market failures. Joint action may raise collective efficiency, by internalising externalities, and this could be more appropriate than state intervention. Fourthly, addressing national co-ordination failures based on scale economies is probably the most far reaching in scope and hence the most risky; such co-ordination failures go beyond the traditional market failures identified in the traditional service-delivery state, and move into the domain of the social transformation state, Khan (2002).

Finally, government intervention carries the risk of misallocation and rent-seeking behaviour. The reality in many (low-income) countries is that the assumption of an altruistic and non rent-seeking public sector incorrect; while the political economy in Korea and Singapore allowed minimal (or benign) rent-seeking behaviour, there are serious doubts about efficient and effective government intervention in countries with a higher degree of corruption.

7. Justman, M. and Teubal, M. (1995) 'Technological Infrastructure Policy (TIP): creating capabilities and building markets'. *Research Policy*, 25, pp. 259–281.

8. Lall, S. (2001) *Competitiveness, Technology and Skills*. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.

9. Rodrik, D. (1996) 'Co-ordination Failures and Government Policy: a model with applications to East Asia and Eastern Europe'. *Journal of International Economics*, 40, pp. 1–22; and Rodrik, D. (2003) 'Growth Strategies' in the *Handbook of Economic Growth*. Forthcoming.

10. Lall, S. and Teubal, M. (2001) 'Market-stimulating technology policies in developing countries: a framework with examples from East Asia' in Lall, S. ed. (2001) *Competitiveness, Technology and Skills*. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.

11. te Velde, D.W. and Xenogiani, T. (2005) 'Foreign Direct Investment and International Skill Inequality'. *Oxford Development Studies*, forthcoming.

12. Wood, A. and Ridao-Cano, C. (1999) 'Skill, Trade and International Inequality'. *Oxford Economic Papers*, 51, pp. 89–119.

13. Hausmann, R. and Rodrik, D. (2002) 'Economic Development as Self-Discovery'. NBER Discussion Paper 8952.

## 2.3 The importance of effective state-business relations

Effective state-business relations can help to solve co-ordination failure, suggest a more appropriate allocation of resources, and provide checks and balances on government intervention. A more transparent way of sharing information will also increase the level of trust between the public and private sector. Hisahiro argues that various forms of information and resources, which are dispersed among entities in the public and private sector, need to be integrated in a more sophisticated way to jointly coordinate policies and provide better public services. It is this combination of insulation and connectedness that minimises the risks and enhances the effectiveness of economic policies.

SBRs can help to address co-ordination failures as government action on its own is risky. Any intervention needs to be updated when new information becomes available, and it is therefore essential to consult the market using effective SBRs. Stiglitz argues that the flexibility of policy interventions is important in securing a positive outcome<sup>14</sup> – East Asian governments adapted to changing economic conditions and withdrew policies if they did not work. Inflexible policies or inadequate institutions addressing market failures are unlikely to be relevant for private sector development in the long run.

## 2.4 What constitutes good state-business relations

John Harriss suggests that good SBRs are based on benign collaboration between business and the state (i.e. an embedded autonomy) with positive mechanisms<sup>15</sup> that:

- make for the flow of accurate and reliable information, both ways, between business and government (i.e. there is *transparency*)
- mean that there is at least the likelihood of *reciprocity* between business and government (as, for example, when state actors have the capacity and the autonomy to secure improved performance in return for subsidies)
- mean that capitalists are able to believe what state actors say (they have *credibility*, in other words – and when they do command credibility then it is likely to be possible for them to respond flexibly to changing circumstances without losing the confidence of business people)
- establish high levels of *trust* (which really subsumes the foregoing points about transparency, reciprocity and credibility)'.

Too close a collaboration between business and states amounts to collusive behaviour and potentially harmful rent-seeking behaviour and favouritism without transparent information sharing for all firms.

Practitioners have only recently begun to characterise what constitutes good public-private dialogue. There is a website <http://publicprivatedialogue.org/> with case studies for several countries including a few for Africa and there was a 2006 workshop in Paris that drew on expertise in DFID, the World Bank, IFC, and OECD Development Centre, resulting in a Charter of Good Practice in using Public-Private Dialogue for Private Sector Development, see Box 1.

### PRINCIPLE I: MANDATE AND INSTITUTIONAL ALIGNMENT

A statement of objective is helpful for clarity. A formal or legal mandate can be an important help in some political and economic contexts, but mandates are never sufficient to establish good Public-Private Dialogue (PPD). Wherever hosted and whenever possible, PPD should be aligned with existing institutions to maximise the institutional potential and minimize friction.

### PRINCIPLE II: STRUCTURE AND PARTICIPATION

PPD's structure should be manageable while flexible, enable participation to be both balanced and effective, and reflect the local private sector context.

### PRINCIPLE III: CHAMPIONS

It is difficult to sustain dialogue without champions from both the public and private sectors, who invest in the process and drive it forward.

### PRINCIPLE IV: FACILITATOR

A facilitator who commands the respect of stakeholders can greatly improve the prospects of PPD.

### PRINCIPLE V: OUTPUTS

Outputs can take the shape of structure and process outputs, analytical outputs or recommendations. All should contribute to agreed private sector development outcomes.

### PRINCIPLE VI: OUTREACH AND COMMUNICATIONS

Enabling communication of a shared vision and understanding through the development of a common language is essential for building trust among stakeholders.

14. Stiglitz, J.E. (1996) 'Some lessons from the East Asian Miracle'. *World Bank Research Observer*, 11, pp. 151-177.

15. Harriss, J. (2006) 'Institutions and State-Business Relations'. IPPG Briefing Note Two; and Evans, P. (1995) *Embedded Autonomy: States and Industrial Transformation*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

**PRINCIPLE VII: MONITORING & EVALUATION**

Monitoring and evaluation is an effective tool to manage the public private dialogue process and to demonstrate its purpose and performance.

**PRINCIPLE VIII: SUB-NATIONAL**

Public-private dialogue is desirable at all levels of decision-making down to the most local possible level, especially as this is likely to be more practically capable of involving micro-entrepreneurs, SMEs and other local stakeholders.

**PRINCIPLE IX: SECTOR-SPECIFIC**

Sector-specific or issue-specific public-private dialogues should be encouraged because they provide more focus, greater incentive to collaborate, and more opportunity for action.

**PRINCIPLE X: INTERNATIONAL ROLE**

Broad and inclusive public-private dialogue can effectively represent and promote national and regional interests of both public and private actors in international negotiations and international dialogue processes.

**PRINCIPLE XI: POST-CONFLICT / CRISIS-RECOVERY / RECONCILIATION**

Public-private dialogue is particularly valuable in post-conflict and crisis environments – including post-natural disaster – to consolidate peace and rebuild the economy through private sector development.

**PRINCIPLE XII: DEVELOPMENT PARTNERS**

Public-private dialogue initiatives can benefit from the input and support of donors (development partners) when their role is determined by the local context, demand-driven, and based on partnership, co-ordination and additionality.

**Box 1 Charter for Good Practice in using Public-Private Dialogue for Private Sector Development**

Source: <http://publicprivatedialogue.org/charter/>

**3. MEASURING STATE-BUSINESS RELATIONS**

In order to measure SBRs and assess its importance for economic performance, we need to determine the essence of SBRs. As the practitioner's guide and literature in section 2 indicated, there are four main elements responsible for good SBRs:

- the way in which the private sector is organised vis-à-vis the public sector
- the way in which the public sector is organised vis-à-vis the private sector
- the practice and institutionalisation of SBRs
- the avoidance of harmful collusive behaviour.

**3.1 How is the private sector organised vis-à-vis the public sector?**

Good SBRs can not be sustained in the long run without effective private sector participation; Weiss indicates that the more firms are involved in business associations the easier it makes to co-ordinate policy between the government and business.<sup>16</sup> The importance of business associations is further emphasised by Hisahiro (2005) who suggests they play a significant role in facilitating the formulation, implementation, and monitoring of economic policies and provision of feedback to the government. Against this there are questions raised as to whether there is a bias of business associations towards certain type of firms; a representative umbrella organisation for all private sector associations is also present in some countries.

Some would argue that there is no business case for firms to organise themselves, as they could lobby government directly. Indeed, large natural resources firms might go directly to the government to negotiate new terms or address barriers in customs. We argue that business associations will help firms because

- organised associations can have a greater impact on government, because they can provide a more coherent and consistent case;
- it is cheaper by avoiding the need for firms to duplicate lobbying efforts.

However, even though governments concerned with overall development (not individual firm performance) may have an incentive to act on an organised business lobby, in practice firms may communicate with government in two ways: lobbying government through an association and alone. To check that this is indeed the case, and that an association is also used even though an individual firm is already bargaining and large, we examined survey data on firm's lobbying behaviour in Zambia: Table 1 shows for a survey of firms in Zambia that the majority of both lobbying and non-lobbying firms is a member of an association, and this is even more likely for larger firms. This counteracts the hypothesis that larger firms do not find

16. Weiss, L. (1998) *The Myth of the Powerless State*. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press.

it necessary to bargain through an association – in fact larger firms are more likely to find the association effective than smaller firms (final set of columns and rows).

**Table 1 Are firms that lobby themselves a member of a business association? The case of Zambia**

	Firm member of association	Firm not a member of association	Perceived effectiveness of association (numbers of firms answering)				
	Number and percentage rows	adds over	No	Minor	Moderate	Major	Decisive
Firm does lobby	74 (82%)	16 (18%)	14	28	41	36	6
Firm does not lobby	69 (59%)	47 (41%)	8	8	12	8	5
Size 1–19	4 (50%)	4 (50%)	0	2	0	2	2
Size 20–100	42 (67%)	21 (33%)	11	9	20	9	1
Size >100	98 (72%)	38 (28%)	11	25	30	33	8

Source: Enterprise surveys, the World Bank Group

The measurement of the role of the private sector in state-business relations will examine:

- the number of private sector business organisations in a country;
- the prevalence of these organisations in the overall community;
- the presence and length of existence of any umbrella organisation linking other businesses and associations together.

### 3.2 How is the government organised vis-à-vis the private sector?

The government faces numerous decisions on how it may organise itself to interact with business. An important measure is the presence and effectiveness of an investment promotion agency (IPA) which could be seen as indicative for advocacy of private sector interests as a whole; another would be the presence of a governing unit specifically for the private sector. The overall direction of the government, the strength of the party in power, and the strength of the opposition may often be defining factors in the nature of the public sector, and such occurrences may also be captured. Weiss also thinks that the government is the 'senior partner' in the state-business relationship and claims the government directs the policy patterns, but stresses the interdependent nature of the state-business relationship.<sup>17</sup>

The measurement of the private sector in state-business relations will examine:

- the presence and length of existence of an investment promotion agency (IPA) to promote business
- Government institutions that interact with and provide support for business.

### 3.3 How do states interact with business?

Effective SBRs requires the co-operation of the public and private sector, but co-operation and willingness alone may not be enough for dialogue to be useful and effective. To examine these qualities, we can look at a number of factors: first, we can see if there is a mechanism of public-private dialogue; without a mechanism, usually in the form of a forum, it is more difficult for the state and the private sector to be on agreeable terms in a transparent way, and thereby avoiding harmful collusive behaviour. This mechanism can come in a number of different forms: it can be open to all and autonomous of government intervention as is the case with a formal existing body, or it can be an informal 'suggestive' body with no entrenched power. Forum statistics such as when it was founded and how often it meets, will provide an idea of the forum's strength.

17. Weiss, L. et al (1995) *States and Economic Development: a Comparative Historical Analysis*. Oxford: Polity.



The measurement of how the state interacts with business will examine:

- the format, frequency, and existence of state-business relations;
- the nature of state-business relations, formal or informal.

### 3.4 Mechanisms to avoid harmful collusive behaviour

Competition laws are created for the benefit of business competition and promoting the creation of new business; both the existence of such laws and the length of their existence will be used as initial indicators of a country's commitment to such competition policies, though it will also be important to consider whether the laws have been effective.

The measurement of mechanisms to avoid collusive behaviour will examine the presence and length of existence of laws protecting business practices and competition

## 4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS FOR SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

### 4.1 How is the private sector organised vis-à-vis the public sector?

Table 2 describes the private sector in the studied countries: the first two columns listing the number of Private Sector Organisations (PSOs) and Developmental Organisations (DOs) are taken from Appendix A; column 4 is a simple ratio of column 2 (PSOs) to column 3 (DOs). Mauritius, Botswana, and South Africa all maintain PSOs/DOs ratios above the average of the rest of the countries; poor countries such as Eritrea and Ethiopia fall below the average, though Malawi is above the average; the largest ratio belongs to Madagascar. It is important to note that these are quantitative numbers that do not take into account the efficacy, size, or development of the organisations.

The next set of columns examines whether there is a private sector umbrella organisation. This is a proxy for how the private sector as a whole is able to mobilise itself; the most developed countries in SSA have developed private sector umbrella organisations with history and standing dating back into the 1970s or earlier. Eritrea has no umbrella organisation, while Ethiopia and Malawi each formed one in the last 15 years. The age of the institution should also be a rough indicator of how entrenched it is within the private sector, although some institutions might be dormant. This measure shows an improvement over time: in 1990, only 25% of the countries (5/20) in this study had an umbrella organisation; by 2000, 55% (11/20) of the countries had umbrella organisations, and now that number is currently 70% (14/20).

Table 2 How is the Private Sector Organised?

Country	Private Sector Organizations	Total Development Organizations	Ratio	Private Sector Umbrella Organization?		If yes... <i>Starting</i>	<i>Name</i>
				Yes	No		
Benin	14	246	5.7%	1	0	1965	CCIB
Botswana	12	178	6.7%	1	0	1977	BFTU
Côte d'Ivoire	29	268	10.8%	0	1	N/A	N/A
Eritrea	4	115	3.5%	0	1	N/A	N/A
Ethiopia	20	469	4.3%	1	0	1992	ECC
Ghana	21	492	4.3%	1	0	1994	PEF
Kenya	37	945	3.9%	1	0	1965	KNCC
Madagascar	29	217	13.4%	0	1	N/A	N/A
Malawi	18	230	7.8%	1	0	2000	MCCI
Mali	13	456	2.9%	0	1	N/A	N/A
Mauritius	12	135	8.9%	1	0	1965	MCCI
Mozambique	12	294	4.1%	1	0	1999	CTA
Nigeria	21	616	3.4%	0	1	N/A	N/A
Rwanda	7	263	2.7%	1	0	1999	RPSF
Senegal	33	580	5.7%	1	0	1995	CDPS
South Africa	59	830	7.1%	1	0	1959	SAF/BL
Tanzania	19	434	4.4%	1	0	2000	TPSF
Uganda	44	638	6.9%	1	0	1995	PSFU
Zambia	29	344	8.4%	1	0	2003	ZBF
Zimbabwe	16	391	4.1%	0	1	N/A	N/A
<b>Total</b>	<b>449</b>	<b>8141</b>	<b>5.5%</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>6</b>		

### 4.2 How is the government organised vis-à-vis the private sector?

Table 3 shown below is used to describe the public sectors of the studied countries. The columns denote the presence of an IPA and some 90% of the countries within this study do in fact have an IPA (the two countries currently without a known IPA being Eritrea and Madagascar). The mere presence of an

IPA, even for a long duration, is not enough for a country to be successful, as can be seen in the case of Tanzania; Tanzania has one of the second oldest IPAs in Africa (1986), second only to South Africa – IPAs are a relatively new phenomenon in the region as Tanzania and South Africa were the only countries with an IPA presence in 1990.

Table 3 Is there an Investment Promotion Agency (IPA)?

<b>Is there an Investment Promotion Agency (IPA)?</b>			
<b>Country</b>	<b>Yes</b>	<b>No</b>	<b>Starting Date</b>
Benin	1	0	1996
Botswana	1	0	1997
Côte d'Ivoire	1	0	1993
Eritrea	0	1	N/A
Ethiopia	1	0	2002
Ghana	1	0	1994
Kenya	1	0	2004
Madagascar	0	1	N/A
Malawi	1	0	1991
Mali	1	0	1996
Mauritius	1	0	2001
Mozambique	1	0	1997
Nigeria	1	0	1995
Rwanda	1	0	1998
Senegal	1	0	2000
South Africa	1	0	1973
Tanzania	1	0	1986
Uganda	1	0	1991
Zambia	1	0	1991
Zimbabwe	1	0	1993
<b>Total</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>1994 (avg)</b>

Source: See Appendix B

#### 4.3 How do states interact with business?

The first category in Table 4 examines whether institutionalised public-private dialogue (PPD) exists. Some 75% of the countries studied currently have such PPD in place; however, only one country, Mauritius, had any PPD in place before 1992. Eritrea, Madagascar, Rwanda, Ivory Coast, and Benin are amongst the countries without an institutionalised PPD system; the second column examines the number of meetings these institutions formally schedule. This number may be deceiving as nearly all of the institutions have the ability to call *ad hoc* meetings and/or also meet in smaller groups: Malawi leads the way with six institutionalised meetings per year and South Africa holds four.

Of the fifteen countries with PPD institutions, over half (8/15) are formal. The most developed countries in the region hold formal PPD fora, including the long running Joint Economic Council of Mauritius (1970); of the eight formal PPD institutions, five (Botswana, Mauritius, South Africa, Zambia, and Zimbabwe) hold multiple meetings per year. Zimbabwe's PPD institutions are of low quality despite their formal status (Appendix B); meanwhile, Zambia's institutions are very recent, created in 2004.

#### Table 4 How are the State-Business Relations Organised?

Boxes 2 and 3 are examples of the most developed and institutionalised state-business relations in sub-Saharan Africa: the JEC (Joint Economic Council from 1970) in Mauritius and NEDLAC (National Economic Development and Labour Council from 1994) in South Africa. Appendix B has further details such as on the High Level Consultative Council (HLCC) in Botswana.

Country	Institutionalized PPD		If Yes Name	Frequency (per year)	Starting Date	If Yes: Formal or Informal	
	Yes	No				Formal	Informal
Benin	0	1	-	-	-	-	-
Botswana	1	0	HLCC	2	1996	1	0
Côte d'Ivoire	0	1	-	-	-	-	-
Eritrea	0	1	-	-	-	-	-
Ethiopia	1	0	PPDF	1	2002	1	-
Ghana	1	0	EF	2	2001	0	1
Kenya	1	0	NCWTO	not regular	1995	0	1
Madagascar	0	1	-	-	-	-	-
Malawi	1	0	NAG	6	2001	0	1
Mali	1	0	CNCE	2	1997	0	1
Mauritius	1	0	JEC	2	1970	1	0
Mozambique	1	0	PSC	1	1998	0	1
Nigeria	1	0	NESG	1	1996	1	0
Rwanda	0	1	-	-	-	-	-
Senegal	1	0	CPI	2	2002	0	1
South Africa	1	0	NEDLAC	4	1994	1	0
Tanzania	1	0	TNBC	1	2001	1	0
Uganda	1	0	NF	1	1992	0	1
Zambia	1	0	PSDF	2	2004	1	0
Zimbabwe	1	0	NECF	4	1997	1	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>5</b>				<b>8</b>	<b>7</b>

### Box 2 State-Business Relations in South Africa: NEDLAC

NEDLAC has four constituencies that meet to discuss and form consensus on social and economic policy:

- (1) **The Government:** Departments of Labour, Finance, Public Works and Trade and Industry
- (2) **Organized Business:** Under the umbrella of Business South Africa (BSA) and the National African Federated Chamber of Commerce (Nafcoc)
- (3) **Organized Labour:** Under the umbrella of the Congress of South African Trade Unions (Cosatu), the National Council of Trade Unions (Nactu) and the Federation of Unions in South Africa (Fedusa);
- (4) **The Community:** South African Youth Council, National Women's Coalition, South African National Civics Organisation, Disabled People of South Africa, and the National Co-operatives Association of South Africa.

All agreements and findings under NEDLAC are made public and tabled in Parliament. The NEDLAC Annual Summit brings together delegates representing over 300 constituencies.

### Box 3 State-Business Relations in Mauritius: JEC

The primary institution for state-business relations in Mauritius is the the Joint Economic Council (JEC, 1970). The JEC meets with the prime minister on a regular basis and participates in budget proposals. The JEC of Mauritius is funded entirely by its members, which include

- Mauritius Chamber of Commerce and Industry
- Mauritius Chamber of Agriculture
- Mauritius Employers' Federation
- Mauritius Sugar Producers' Association
- Mauritius Export Processing Zone Association
- Mauritius Bankers' Association
- Mauritius Insurers' Association
- Association des Hôteliers et Restaurateurs de l'île Maurice
- Association of Mauritian Manufacturers

The Joint Economic Council is managed by a Council of 18 members, with a Chairman who rotates every two years and a full-time Director. As of 1999, the JEC's top goals are to ensure a stable macro economic environment, foster greater fiscal discipline, restore financial health, and integrate all sectors of the economy in order to reduce distortions and improve efficiency of investment.

#### 4.4 Mechanisms to avoid harmful collusive behaviour

Table 5 examines the presence of competition laws protecting both consumers and businesses within the country. The most developed economies in sub-Saharan Africa have these laws in place, though in the case of Botswana and Mauritius, they have only come into being in the last ten years. Meanwhile, neither Eritrea nor Ethiopia has these laws in place. Again, there is a difficulty in measuring the gap between the presence of laws with the teeth and enforcement; despite this, it could be the case that weak competition laws will allow countries to perform better than no competition laws at all. It may also be the case that evidence comes to light that shows that the competition law is not biting.

Table 5 Competition Laws

Country	Are there Competition Laws?		If Yes... Starting Date?
	Yes	No	
Benin	1	0	2003
Botswana	1	0	1996
Côte d'Ivoire	1	0	1997
Eritrea	0	1	N/A
Ethiopia	0	1	N/A
Ghana	0	1	N/A
Kenya	1	0	1989
Madagascar	0	1	N/A
Malawi	1	0	1998
Mali	1	0	1992
Mauritius	1	0	2003
Mozambique	0	1	N/A
Nigeria	0	1	N/A
Rwanda	0	1	N/A
Senegal	1	0	1995
South Africa	1	0	1979
Tanzania	1	0	2003
Uganda	0	1	N/A
Zambia	1	0	1994
Zimbabwe	1	0	1996
<b>Totals</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>8</b>	

Source: see Appendix B


## 4.5 Summarising results by country for the period 1970–2005

The above sections showed that it is possible to measure aspects of SBRs, according to four indicators of good SBRs:

- The way the *private sector* is organised, a score of 0 for each country in a given year if it did not have a private sector umbrella organisation, 1 if it did (e.g. Malawi is 0 for 1970–1999 and 1 for 2000–2005).
- The way the *public sector* is organised, score 0 for each country in a given year if it did not have an IPA, 1 if it did (e.g. Botswana created BEDIA – a public sector organisation addressing investor promotion – in 1997, so the sub-variable Public Sector would get a score 0 until 1997 and 1 afterwards).
- The practice and *institutionalisation* of SBRs, score 0 for each country in a given year if it did not have an institutionalised PPD, 0.5 if it did but with frequency of 1 meeting or less, and 1 if it did and with a frequency of 2 meetings or more.
- The presence of *anti-collusive behaviour*, score 0 for each country in a given year if it did not have a competition policy in place, 0.5 if it did have a policy in place but not effective (due to evidence), and 1 if it did and it was effective.


This leads to four, time-varying indicators per country and in order to obtain a composite measure, we have taken the average of the above indicators (this is crude as it attaches the same weight to each indicator); Appendix D shows the raw data for country-specific averages. Chart 1 plots the averages for four groups of countries, ranging from the fastest growing groups over 1970–2005 (group 1) to the slowest growing group (group 4); as expected, country groups with higher SBR scores grow faster. Chart 2 shows that faster growth has followed institutional development for state-business relations over the past decade, though this is indicative of a simple and very crude correlation. The right panel shows that positive growth coincided with a higher SBR.

Chart 1 Higher SBR scores for groups of faster growing countries



Notes: Group 1 = Botswana, Mauritius, Uganda, Mozambique, Mali; Group 2 = Tanzania, Ghana, Eritrea (part), Senegal, Kenya; Group 3 = Benin, Ethiopia, South Africa, Nigeria, Rwanda; Group 4 = Malawi, Zimbabwe, Madagascar, Zambia, Cote d'Ivoire. Groups based on PPP GDP per capita growth rates over 1980–2004.

Chart 2 Average GDP per capita (growth) and SBR scores for Sub Saharan Africa



Source: WDI 2006 and text

## 5. COMPARING WITH OTHER GOVERNANCE MEASURES

It will be important to test whether the SBR measure is correlated with other governance indicators. Many governance indicators, such as the World Bank's 'Kaufmann Governance Indicators', are based on perceptions of government effectiveness, rule of law, etc.; our measure is based on an objective description of the institutional set-up to support and conduct effective SBRs – nevertheless, it could be a useful comparison. It is also instructive to compare the SBR measure with other, more operational, investment climate measures and finally, we will compare the measures with indicators obtained from Enterprise Surveys, by the World Bank Group.

Table 6 presents Pearson correlations between the SBR measure and other governance indicators for 20 SSA countries, for one year at a time. It shows no significant correlation with control of corruption and political stability, but a significant correlation with the indicators 'Voice and Accountability', 'Government Effectiveness' and 'Regulatory Quality' in most of the years and a significant correlation with rule of law for 2 of the years. Hence, there is a reasonable correlation across countries between SBR and perceptions of governance variables relevant for private sector development.

Table 6 Correlations between SBR measures and Kaufmann indicators across countries, by year

	1996	1998	2000	2002	2004
Voice and Accountability	<b>0.452 (0.046)</b>	0.432 (0.057)	0.432 (0.058)	<b>0.550 (0.012)</b>	<b>0.540 (0.014)</b>
Political Stability	-0.041 (0.865)	0.106 (0.658)	0.117 (0.622)	0.199 (0.4)	0.273 (0.244)
Government Effectiveness	<b>0.580 (0.007)</b>	0.147 (0.536)	0.359 (0.120)	<b>0.530 (0.016)</b>	<b>0.495 (0.026)</b>
Regulatory Quality	<b>0.512 (0.021)</b>	<b>0.479 (0.033)</b>	0.281 (0.231)	<b>0.475 (0.034)</b>	0.374 (0.104)
Rule of Law	0.437 (0.054)	<b>0.450 (0.047)</b>	0.264 (0.260)	0.374 (0.104)	<b>0.454 (0.044)</b>
Control of Corruption	not available	0.346 (0.136)	0.301 (0.198)	0.201 (0.396)	0.301 (0.197)

Source: SBR for 20 SSA countries, see text; others, World Bank Kaufmann indicators

Note: Significance levels between parentheses (significant at 5% if < 0.05).

Table 7 presents correlations over time, that is, it relates changes over time in the SBR variable with changes in the other indicators over the same period. The first column examines short differences of two-year intervals, while the final columns examine changes over the entire period. It shows that the correlation with SBR over time is very weak, particularly in the case of short-run changes, though this might be expected since changes in perceptions can occur rapidly, while changes in institutional set-ups (SBR) occur more gradually.

Table 7 Correlations between SBR measures and Kaufmann indicators over time

	2004–1996 (short differences)		2004–1996 (long differences)	
	Co-efficient	Significance	Co-efficient	Significance
				(<0.05)
Voice and Accountability	0.015	0.894	0.23	0.33
Political Stability	0.029	0.799	0.331	0.154
Government Effectiveness	0.047	0.682	0.357	0.122
Regulatory Quality	0.143	0.205	0.36	0.119
Rule of Law	0.095	0.403	0.19	0.43
Control of Corruption	0.059	0.61	N/A	N/A

Source: SBR for 20 SSA countries, see text; others, World Bank Kaufmann indicators

It is also possible to compare the SBR variable with the various 'Investment Climate Indicators' contained in the World Bank's *Doing Business Reports*. These indicators describe the difficulties faced by normal business operations, such as the number of procedures it takes to obtain licences, etc., export goods and services; although some procedures are likely to be necessary, others could be streamlined. The hypothesis relevant for this paper is whether higher scores on SBR would lead to a more streamlined administration (i.e. fewer regulations and time wasted when trading); Table 8 shows that this is indeed the case for a cross section of the 20 SSA countries in 2005 (there is too little information to get a reasonable variation across time).

Table 8 Correlations between SBR measures and Investment Climate indicators: Trading Across Borders

	Co-efficient	Significance (<0.05)
Documents (Exports)	-0.339	0.143
Signatures (Exports)	-0.395	0.085
Time (Exports)	-0.462	<b>0.04</b>
Documents (Imports)	-0.397	0.083
Signatures (Imports)	-0.383	0.096
Time (Imports)	-0.471	<b>0.036</b>

Source: Text for SBR, 2003, and the World Bank's Doing Business Report 2006

Table 9 presents a comparison between the value of the SBR measure with membership and perceptions of private sector organisations on the basis of Enterprise Surveys conducted by the World Bank Group. It shows the percentage of firms belonging to a private sector organisation, whether the association lobbies the government and whether the association is considered effective; there does not seem to be a simple correlation between a high SBR score and perceived effectiveness of the association, so this needs further attention. A further benefit of micro level data is that it is possible to disaggregate views on state-business relations by state, sector and size of firm and Table 10 shows the value of business associations in different areas, by three firm size categories. One of the most striking findings for both South Africa and Zambia is that smaller firms attach less value to the business association in terms of lobbying the government than do larger firms.

Table 9 Evidence on State-Business Relations from Enterprise Surveys

Year of Data	SBR Score	Member of Private Sector Organization?		Does Association Lobby Government?		Is Association Effective in Lobbying? 4=Most Value 0/1=Least Value								
Country		Yes	No	%Yes	%No	Yes	No	%Yes	%No	0	1	2	3	4
Benin	0.5	110	84	56.7	43.3					N/A	20	7	12	5
Ethiopia	0.63	222	143	60.82	39.18					55	35	29	35	28
Kenya-Man	0.63									31	25	50	79	22
Madagascar	0	151	132	53.36	46.64					24	23	27	16	2
Mali	0.63	95	45	67.86	32.14									
Mauritius	0.88	120	83	59.11	40.89									
Mozambique	0.63	91	92	49.73	50.27	65	39	62.50	37.50					
Senegal	0.88	57	189	23.17	76.83									
South Africa-Man	1	361	238	60.27	39.73					159	80	62	35	16
Tanzania	0.75	113	138	45.02	54.98	129	33	79.63	20.37	26	28	50	32	18
Uganda-Man	0.63	176								21	33	39	45	24
Zambia	0.63	141	62	69.46	30.54	128	12	91.43	8.57	14	30	45	23	15
Other Questions														
Country		Did you use the private sector association services?		Yes	No	%Yes	%No	How much influence do business associations have on impacting regulation affecting your business? 4=Most Impact 0/1=Least Impact						
Benin	2004	20	90	18.18	81.82			0	1	2	3	4		
Country		Did your firm seek to lobby Government/to otherwise influence laws?		Yes	No	%Yes	%No							
South Africa	2003	113	487	18.83	81.17			22	35	53	41	11		
Zambia	2003	87	115	43.07	56.93									

Source: Enterprise Surveys, the World Bank Group



Table 10 Business Association, Mean Value to Firm, by Firm Size Category

	South Africa			Zambia		
	Size 1 (0–10): 4 Obs.	Size 2 (11–50): 73 Obs.	Size 3 (51+): 281 Obs.	Size 1 (0–10): 3 Obs.	Size 2 (11–50): 38 Obs.	Size 3 (51+): 89 Obs.
a) Lobbying government	0.2500	0.8195	1.1341	1.0000	1.7632	2.0787
b) Resolution of disputes	1.0000	0.7857	0.8199	1.0000	2.4667	1.5588
c) Information and/or contacts on domestic products and input markets	0.5000	1.0411	1.1957	2.0000	2.0000	1.9048
d) Information and/or contacts on international product and input markets	0.7500	1.0411	1.1044	2.5000	1.9048	1.8572
e) Accrediting standards or quality of products; reputational benefits	0.0000	0.6713	0.9783	1.5000	2.0000	1.6098
f) Information on government regulations	1.0000	1.4932	1.6726	2.6667	2.1936	2.2706

Note: value ranges from 0 (no value) to 3; size is based on number of employees in private sector firms

## 6. CONCLUSIONS

While many factors contribute to economic growth in a measurable way, this paper suggests that an effective SBR is one of the important underlying factors which has so far been difficult to measure. Effective SBRs drive a more optimal allocation of resources in the economy, including an increased effectiveness of government involvement in supporting private sector activities and removing obstacles.

Effective SBRs are linked to the literature on good governance; while being part of the governance literature, effective SBRs may also *lead to* and *prioritise* governance reforms.

In-depth discussions of state-business relations have so far been largely limited to Asian countries such as Korea, Taiwan, Japan, Malaysia, Bangladesh and Thailand. Measurement of state-business relations for sub-Saharan African countries has been patchy or absent.

The aim of this paper was to measure the key factors associated with effective SBRs for 20 sub-Saharan African countries over the period 1970–2005. These key factors were based on theory and practice: an organised private sector, an organised public sector, an institutionalised mechanism of SBR, and absence of harmful collusive behaviour. We scored 20 countries over time on the basis of these factors and calculated a composite SBR indicator.

The new measures seem plausible: first, higher scores are associated with faster growth (though more precise work will be done in a next phase); secondly, the new measures correlate well with other governance indicators (though with different interpretations); and thirdly, they correlate with more operational investment climate data, such as fewer procedures when exporting goods and services.

We suggest two ways forward: first, we need to measure the impact of the variable SBR on economic performance using macro and micro level data, taking into account other causes of growth; we will undertake this in the next phase. Secondly, we need further detailed descriptions of state-business relations across African countries over time – for instance, there does not seem to be a simple correlation between a high SBR score and perceived effectiveness of the association, so this needs further attention; going into detail will enable us to measure more specificities of state-business relations and therefore evaluate which specific circumstances are associated with effective SBRs.

# Appendix A

## DEVELOPMENT ACTORS IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

The Directory of Developmental Organisations (DDO) creates an annual list of now over 47,000 known developmental organisations, which does not claim to be exhaustive, but it seems comprehensive enough to be a good representation for each country. The DDO lists organisations by country and then by sector into one of the following nine categories: international organisations; government; private sector support organisations; finance institutions; training and research organisations; civil society organisations; development consulting firms; information providers; and grantmakers. Table A1 lists the quantitative count of these categories for each country; Table A1 provides the same breakdown for two developed countries (United States, United Kingdom) as well as two big developing countries (China, India).

The following are some examples of the organisations classified in one of the nine categories:

- *International Organisations*: including for example UN organisations, World Bank, IMF, IADB, AfSB, AsDB.
- *Government*: ministries, government institutions, planning agencies.
- *Private Sector Support Organisations*: chambers of commerce and industry, fairtrade organisations, trade promotion organisations for SMEs.
- *Finance Institutions*: central banks, national development banks, commercial banks, credit unions, microfinance institutions, finance houses.
- *Training and Research Organisations*: universities, research centres and institutions, training institutes.
- *Civil Society Organisations*: development foundations and associations, membership development organisations, microfinance institutions, faith-based development organisations, development programmes and projects.
- *Development Consulting Firms*: including job opportunities and vacancy announcements.
- *Information Providers*: development newsletters/journals, development publishers, web resources, databases.
- *Grantmakers*: fundraising, charity and philanthropic organisations.

Table A1 How can Development Associations be Categorized?

Country	International Organizations	Government Institutions	Private Sector Support	Finance Institutions	Training and Research Centres	Civil Society	Development Consulting Firms	Information Providers	Grantmakers	Total
Benin	18	25	14	24	22	140	0	3	0	246
Botswana	22	23	12	11	23	81	3	3	0	178
Côte d'Ivoire	46	23	29	43	30	91	1	5	0	268
Eritrea	23	18	4	4	5	58	1	2	0	115
Ethiopia	55	37	20	34	52	262	3	6	0	469
Ghana	38	39	21	146	63	174	6	3	2	492
Kenya	73	40	37	65	131	571	13	11	4	945
Madagascar	30	34	29	19	29	69	2	5	0	217
Malawi	27	29	18	20	26	101	2	6	1	230
Mali	35	43	13	43	43	271	5	3	0	456
Mauritius	12	52	12	12	17	25	2	3	0	135
Mozambique	46	29	12	22	26	152	4	3	0	294
Nigeria	41	29	21	79	86	351	2	6	1	616
Rwanda	31	35	7	14	14	156	1	5	0	263
Senegal	50	48	33	84	74	281	3	7	0	580
South Africa	58	100	59	88	157	280	27	29	32	830
Tanzania	49	42	19	44	47	214	12	5	2	434
Uganda	45	54	44	78	64	340	11	2	0	638
Zambia	35	58	29	22	35	149	11	5	0	344
Zimbabwe	45	29	16	22	49	215	8	7	0	391
<b>Others</b>										
India	73	88	49	231	348	641	28	22	8	1488
China	50	43	49	20	74	176	11	12	3	438
USA	50	90	107	155	437	1067	159	237	175	2548
UK	17	35	71	46	208	442	147	113	28	1107

Source: 2006 Directory of Developmental Organization. <http://www.devdir.org/>

# Appendix B

## STATE-BUSINESS RELATIONS BY COUNTRY

African countries in this study include: Benin, Botswana, Côte d'Ivoire, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritius, Mozambique, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe.

### Benin

#### The Private Sector

The private sector began to organise itself through public sector action. By government mandate, the Chambre de Commerce et d'Industrie du Benin (CCIB) was created in 1965 to serve business interests,<sup>18</sup> the government also declared all women, must join the Union Nationale des Commerçantes du Benin (Unacobe, 1973).<sup>19</sup> By 1985, Unacobe functioned semi-autonomously for business interests and throughout the 1970s and 1980s, traders in Benin formed an organised association to combat authoritarian regimes. Leaders of business associations in 1990 campaigned and entered the new government through democratic elections, increasing the voice of business.

#### The Public Sector

Benin became independent in 1960; it was known as Dahomey prior to 1975. Dahomey went through a series of military coups before settling in 1972 as a Marxist state under Mathieu Kerekou; this government fell in 1990 due to a fiscal collapse; with global aid, the new government collaborated with business and citizens to create new ways of reform.<sup>20</sup> Benin established an investment promotion agency, the Centre de Promotion des Investissements (CPI), in 1996.

#### Collusive Behaviour

Under Kerekou (1972–1990), business associations battled government officials who extorted bribes and tributes for themselves. Kerekou returned to power through democratic elections in 1996, though tampering has been alleged.<sup>21</sup> Benin has no competition laws.<sup>22</sup>

#### Defining Moments in Benin SBR's since the 1970s

- 1972: Kerekou establishes Marxist state
- 1973: Unacobe established
- 1985: Unacobe becomes semi-autonomous
- 1990: Fiscal collapse, elections held and Kerekou ousted
- 1996: Kerekou returns to power
- 1996: CPI established

### Botswana

#### The Private Sector

Organised business in Botswana got its first major start with the Botswana Federation of Trade Unions (BFTU) in 1977. Presently, the Botswana Confederation of Commerce, Industry and Manpower (BOCCIM) is the largest and most representative body in the private sector and has had a major role in the development of these two structures. BOCCIM was founded as the Botswana Employers' Federation (BEF) in 1971 before changing its name to BOCCIM in 1988;<sup>23</sup> the private sector also meets with the government through ad hoc meetings.<sup>24</sup> A further potential contributor to Public-Private Dialogue (PPD) is the Exporters' Association of Botswana (EAOB); though in the government's view, the private sector representatives have not taken advantage of the opportunities given to them, and the PPD fora are being used to reconcile these differences.<sup>25</sup>

18. Volume 1. Benin: Diagnosti Trade Integration Study. 18 December 2005 (<http://www.integratedframework.org/>).

19. Heilbrunn, John R. (1997) 'Commerce, Politics and Business Associations in Benin and Togo. *Comparative Politics*, Vol. 29, No. 4, pp. 473–492.

20. Ibid.

21. CIA, *The World Factbook: Benin*. (<https://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/bn.html>)

22. <http://www.integratedframework.org/>

23. Sheikh, Mukram and Riddle, Dorothy (2003) 'Capacity building to promote exports of services to Botswana.'

24. Mbekeani, Kennedy K., *Managing the Challenges of WTO Participation: Case Study 6. Inter-Agency Policy Co-Ordination in Botswana*. ([http://www.wto.org/english/res\\_e/booksp\\_e/case6\\_e.htm](http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/case6_e.htm))

25. 'Trade policy committee launched' (2004). South African Documentation and Co-Operation Centre (<http://www.sadocc.at/news/2004-087.shtml>).

**BOCCIM<sup>26</sup>**

BOCCIM meets most of its costs from membership fees and fund-raising activities. It no longer receives financial support from an external donor; nearly its entire budget is derived from its 400 largest members. Also, the executive council operates entirely on a voluntary basis.

BOCCIM currently has more than 1,600 members, but the secretariat itself is a small unit with members from the sectoral and regional councils. There are 18 sector councils and 14 regional councils, each with its own appointed representatives.

Small businesses, with between 1 and 25 employees, make up approximately three-quarters of the membership, while just under 18% of the membership comprises medium-sized businesses (25–100 employees) and a little over 6% are large businesses (more than 100 employees). Qualified members can be asked to participate in working groups, review documents and prepare papers for discussion with government.

**The Public Sector**

Botswana has a record of a well managed economy and an open political culture;<sup>27</sup> however, it took many years for the government to recognise private sector representatives.<sup>28</sup> There are two major public/private consultative structures: a biennial conference, the National Business Conference (NBC), and the High Level Consultative Council (HLCC). The NBC was founded in 1988 to facilitate economic participation by the private sector; the HLCC, established in 1966, was created to support the NBC.<sup>29</sup> The HLCC now works jointly with BOCCIM and is a formal institution of PPD. In 1997, Botswana passed the Botswana Export Development and Import Authority Act (BEDIA), creating an investment promotion agency within the country. The Department for International Trade is the primary public institution that takes account private sector interests, primarily through ad hoc meetings. There have been issues over a high turnover rate for ministers potentially affecting PPD negatively.<sup>30</sup> In 2004, under a wing of BEDIA, the National Committee on Trade and Policy Negotiation was established as a formal PPD forum for private and public sector interests.

**Collusive Behaviour**

Botswana is still in the process of adopting competition laws under Section 48 of the 1996 Telecommunications Act and Section 69 of the Industrial Properties Act; Botswana does not have an enforcement agency for this act.<sup>31</sup>

**Defining Moments in Botswana SBR's since the 1970s**

- 1971: BEF founded
- 1988: BEF becomes BOCCIM
- 1988: NBC occurs for first time
- 1996: Competition laws passed
- 1996: HLCC, formal PPD forum
- 1997: BEDIA founded
- 2004: BEDIA's National Committee founded as formal PPD forum

**Côte d'Ivoire (Ivory Coast)****The Private Sector**

Some describe the Ivory Coast system as a patronage system: business associations within industries have failed to emerge; and in addition, most of the businesses operating in the Ivory Coast system are not Ivorian, and thus lack the political stakes.<sup>32</sup>

**The Public Sector**

According to Catherine Boone, the Ivory Coast's ability to structure access to opportunities for accumulation in the commercial sector was an important force shaping the development of local business groups. Facing a major recession, the Ivory Coast accepted a World Bank SAP in 1984;<sup>33</sup> the Ivory Coast

26. *Structured Public-Private Dialogue: The Experience from Botswana.*

([http://www.ecdpm.org/Web\\_ECDPM/Web/Content/Navigation.nsf/index2?readform](http://www.ecdpm.org/Web_ECDPM/Web/Content/Navigation.nsf/index2?readform) and [http://www.ecdpm.org/Web\\_ECDPM/Web/Content.nsf/80Ba021853007405c1256c790053145c/98e4a925ac004ee1c1256c7e003aca9c](http://www.ecdpm.org/Web_ECDPM/Web/Content.nsf/80Ba021853007405c1256c790053145c/98e4a925ac004ee1c1256c7e003aca9c).)

27. Duncan, Alex; Macmillan, Hugh; and Simutanyi, Neo, *Zambia, Drivers of pro-poor change: an overview*. Prepared for DFID.

28. *Reforming the Business Enabling Environment Mechanisms and Processes for Private-Public Sector Dialogue*. Bannock Consulting Ltd. (2003).

29. *Botswana: Towards Prosperity for All. A Comprehensive Development Framework Profile*. World Bank ([http://www.wds.worldbank.org/servlet/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2005/11/15/000160016\\_160016\\_20051115160906/Rendered/INDEX/341450BW0Prosperity0for0all.txt](http://www.wds.worldbank.org/servlet/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2005/11/15/000160016_160016_20051115160906/Rendered/INDEX/341450BW0Prosperity0for0all.txt))

30. Mbekeani, Kennedy K., *Managing the Challenges of WTO Participation: Case Study 6. Inter-Agency Policy Co-Ordination in Botswana*. ([http://www.wto.org/english/res\\_e/booksp\\_e/case6\\_e.htm](http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/case6_e.htm))

31. <http://www.globalcompetitionforum.org/africa.htm#Botswana>

32. Boone, Catherine (1994) 'Trade, Taxes and Tribute: Market Liberalizations and the New Importers in West Africa. *World Development*, Vol. 22, No. 3, pp. 453–467.

33. *Ibid.*

also has an investment promotion agency, the Centre de Promotion des Investissements en Côte d'Ivoire (CEPICI), founded in 1993.

### **Collusive Behaviour**

The Ivory Coast passed new legislation to amend a 1991 Competition Policy Act with the Loi No. 97-10 de 6 Janvier 1997. The country has two dedicated bodies, the Competition Commission and the Department of Competition, to prevent and deter collusion;<sup>34</sup> however, Ivorian governments 'have been able to absorb local business groups into patron-client networks that underpin the political status quo, and to canalise local business into rentier activities mediated by the state.'<sup>35</sup>

### **Defining Moments in Ivory Coast SBR's since the 1970s**

- 1984: Ivory Coast undergoes Second SAP
- 1991: Competition policy initially passed
- 1993: CEPICI founded
- 1997: Competition policy amended

## Eritrea

### **The Private Sector**

Eritrea has very tight restrictions on private enterprise, and military and party owned enterprises have been expanding.<sup>36</sup> The economy is undergoing privatisation slowly because the domestic economy has proven unable to absorb a faster process.<sup>37</sup>

### **The Public Sector**

The government currently has no investment promotion agencies. Due to disputes with Ethiopia, Eritrea spends a greater percentage of its GDP on military than any other country (17.7%)<sup>38</sup> – thus the battle for independence along with border disputes have stunted Eritrea's growth.

### **Collusive Behaviour**

Eritrea currently has no competition laws.<sup>39</sup>

### **Defining Moments in Eritrean SBR's since the 1970s**

- 1993: Achieved independence from Ethiopia
- 1998: War over borders with Ethiopia lasts until 2000

## Ethiopia

### **The Private Sector**

The Ethiopian Chamber of Commerce (ECC) is the primary private sector actor, it was originally founded in 1943, but has since undergone many changes; in 1974, the government nationalised part of the chamber, and it lost its private autonomy until a 1992 shift in government philosophy; however, this change was not official until 2003.

### **The Public Sector**

The Ethiopian Investment Commission (EIC, 2002) operates to promote investment; the Ministry of Trade and Industry (MOTI) in conjunction with the ECC formed the Public-Private Dialogue Forum, but it is seen as highly ineffective,<sup>40 41</sup> though as stated in its Sustainable Development and Poverty Reduction Program (SDPRP) of 2002/2003, the government is committed to PPD.<sup>42</sup>

### **Collusive Behaviour**

Ethiopia has no competition laws yet in force.<sup>43</sup>

### **Defining Moments in Ethiopian SBR's since the 1970s**

- 1974: Government nationalises ECC
- 1992: ECC regains private sector autonomy
- 2002: EIC established
- 2002: PPDF established
- 2003: Ethiopia states commitment to PPD

34. OECD Global Forum on Competition (<http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/35/44/1846118.pdf>)

35. Boone, Catherine (1994) 'Trade, Taxes and Tribute: Market Liberalizations and the New Importers in West Africa'. *World Development*, Vol. 22, No. 3, pp. 453-467.

36. CIA, *The World Factbook: Eritrea*. (<http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/er.html>)

37. Weissman, Robert (1996) 'An African Star?' *Multinational Monitor*, Vol. 17, Jul/Aug.

38. CIA, *The World Factbook: Eritrea*. (<http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/er.html>)

39. <http://www.globalcompetitionforum.org/africa.htm#Eritrea>

40. 'Ethiopia: Trade and Transformation'. *Synthesis. Diagnostic Trade Integration Study*, Vol. 2, 2005 (<http://www.integratedframework.org/>).

41. Zerihun, Admit and Alemu, Getnet (2004) 'The Ethiopian Manufacturing Sector: Competitiveness and the Way Ahead'. Presented at the Ethiopian Economic Association, 2nd International Conference on the Ethiopian Economy, United Nations Conference Centre (UNCC), 3-5 January 2004, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.

42. Ethiopian Chamber of Commerce 'About the ECC' (<http://www.ethiopianchamber.com/about-us.html>).

43. <http://www.globalcompetitionforum.org/africa.htm#Ethiopia>

## Ghana

### The Private Sector

The private sector of Ghana has struggled to make an impact, with one of the challenges long facing the businesses of Ghana being a populist government based on anti-business rhetoric.<sup>44</sup> The Private Enterprise Foundation was founded in 1994 by four major business associations, the Association of Ghana Industries, Ghana National Chamber of Commerce, Ghana Employers' Association, and the Federation of Association of Ghana Exporters. The National Economic Forum, operating under the PEF's umbrella, focuses on supporting the views of small and medium enterprises (SMEs).

### The Public Sector

Years of military rule and public distrust of business have allowed the public sector to reign in economic affairs. However, since accepting the foreign aid that came with the World Bank's Structural Adjustment Program in 1983, Ghana has slowly changed its relation with the private sector; the Ghana Investment Promotion Centre (GIPC) established in 1994 was created by the government to encourage private investment, and in 2001, the Ghana Export Promotion Council (GEPC) established an Exporter's Forum (EF), through which the private sector could interact with its primary counterpart, the Ministry of Trade and Industry. The private sector currently interacts primarily with the Ministry for Private Sector Development, which was created in 2004.

### Collusive Behaviour

The Ghanaian government was under military rule until 1992 – from 1981 until this time, opposition political parties were banned – according to Handley, the government 'tried to build patronage ties to select elements of the business community'.<sup>45</sup> The first elections were marked with protest and political violence; scepticism was also raised when numerous officials from the PNDC, Rawlings' military regime were reappointed by a presidential order.<sup>46</sup> However, the 2000 peaceful transition from National Democratic Congress's Jerry Rawlings to New Patriotic Party's John Kufuor signals improved prospects for Ghanaian relations. Ghana has no current competition laws.<sup>47</sup>

### Defining Moments in Ghanaian SBR's since the 1970s

- 1981: Rawlings suspends constitution and forms military regime
- 1983: Rawlings accepts World Bank aid, and economic reforms that come with SAP
- 1992: Constitution adopted, democratic elections, and first notable PPD
- 2000: Rawlings leaves power after serving 2-term maximum limit; opposing party peaceably takes power
- 2001: EF established
- 2004: MPSD founded to aid relations with private sector

## Kenya

### The Private Sector

The Kenyan private sector is hindered by rivalry amongst indigenous groups, though the Kenya National Chamber of Commerce (KNCCI) was originally founded in 1965 and plays an important role in supporting private sector interests. The most successful Kenyan entrepreneurs have connections to key state institutions,<sup>48</sup> but despite government intervention on their behalf, indigenous Kenyans compose a minimal part of the industrial sector due to a lack of management skills.<sup>49</sup>

### The Public Sector

Kenya adopted the Export Processing Zones Authority (EPZA), in 1990; however, the programme was not enacted until 1993. As a founding member of the WTO, Kenya established the Permanent Inter-Ministerial Committee (PIMC) in 1995 to advise on WTO matters. The PIMC was re-branded as the National Committee on WTO (NCWTO) in 1997 and includes members from the private sector – it is notable that the NCWTO does not have any legal status, and can thus be ignored.<sup>50</sup> Additionally, Kenya established its Investment Promotion Centre, Kenya Investment Authority (KIA), in 2004; the stated goal of the KIA is to promote both foreign and local investment in Kenya.

### Collusive Behaviour

In 1967, Kenya passed a Trade Licensing Act which excluded non-Africans from trading in non-central areas. Kenya passed the Restrictive Trade Practices, Monopolies, and Price Control Act in 1989 to encourage competition in the economy.<sup>51</sup>

44. 'Participation, Consultation and Economic Reform in Africa: Economic Fora and the EG-DG Nexus'. Occasional Paper Series for the Centre for Democracy and Governance – Bureau for Global Programmes, Field Support and Research, US Agency for International Development, October 2001.

45. Handley, Antoinette, 'Business and the state: economic policymaking in Africa's neo-liberal era'. Working Paper.

46. Berry, La Verle, ed. *Ghana: A Country Study*. Federal Research Division, Library of Congress.

47. <http://www.globalcompetitionforum.org/africa.htm#Ghana>

48. Himbara, David (1994) 'The Failed Africanization of Commerce and Industry in Kenya'. *World Development*, Vol. 22, No. 3, pp. 469–482.

49. Ibid.

50. Odhiambo, Walter; Kamau, Paul; and McCormick, Dorothy, 'Kenya's Participation in the WTO: Lessons Learned ([http://www.org/english/res\\_e/booksp\\_e/casestudies\\_e/case20\\_e.htm](http://www.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/casestudies_e/case20_e.htm)).

51. <http://www.globalcompetitionforum.org/africa.htm#Kenya>

### Defining Moments in Kenyan SBR's since the 1970s

- 1989: Kenya passes competition laws
- 1990: Kenya adopts the EPZA (enacted, 1993)
- 1995: PIMC established
- 1997: PIMC changed to NCWTO and incorporates private and civil sectors
- 2004: KIA established

## Madagascar

### The Private Sector

The organised private sector presence in Madagascar is very weak, though it does exist, as in the case of Groupement des Aquaculteurs et Pêcheurs de Crevettes de Madagascar (GAPCM), a collection of fishing enterprises. The President Marc Ravalomanana rose to prestige through successful business enterprise, and was expected to champion capitalism.<sup>52</sup>

### The Public Sector

Madagascar was plagued with nepotism during its one party rule era (1975–1992) and still faces a pervasive spoils system.<sup>53</sup> The Ravalomanana government has carryover linkages with his business enterprise. Ravalomanana was elected amidst a great deal of controversy in 2002 over the incumbent, contributing to a significant immediate fall in GDP. Much of Madagascar's economy is in recovery, and infrastructure improvements are needed.<sup>54</sup>

### Collusive Behaviour

Madagascar currently has no competition laws.<sup>55</sup>

### Defining Moments in Madagascan SBR's since the 1970s

- 1975: Single party rule (socialism)
- 1992: Free elections held
- 2002: Ravalomanana wins election

## Malawi

### The Private Sector

The Malawi Chamber of Commerce and Industry (MCCI) has been in existence since 1892, and undergone many transformations leading to the current model, established in 2000. In 2001, a National Private Sector Workshop led to the creation of the National Action Group by the government. Many members of the private sector are believed to want a formal mechanism of PPD that is not currently in place.<sup>56</sup>

### The Public Sector

The government formed the Malawi Investment Promotion Agency (MIPA) in 1991 to promote private sector development. Malawi has a dedicated ministry for the private sector in the Ministry for Trade and Private Sector Development (MTPSD). The National Action Group (NAG) was formed in 2001 and has been an effective forum, but it lacks a formal status.<sup>57</sup> Two years later, the private and public sectors joined together to issue the Malawi Economic Growth Strategy (MEGS, 2003).<sup>58</sup>

### Collusive Behaviour

Prior to 1990, government enterprise dominated the economy; until 1994, Malawi was a one-party state, which led to privileged ownership and monopolistic behaviour.<sup>59</sup> Malawi passed the Competition and Fair Trading Bill in 1998 to encourage free trade and entrepreneurship.<sup>60</sup>

### Defining Moments in Malawian SBR's since the 1970s

- 1991: MIPA founded
- 1994: Multi-Party system introduced
- 1998: Competition Bill passed
- 2000: MCCI redesigned
- 2001: National Private Sector Workshop
- 2001: NAG formed
- 2003: MEGS issued through joint public-private effort

52. Marcus, Richard R. and Ratsimbaharison, Adrien M. (2005) 'Political Parties in Madagascar – Neopatrimonial Tools or Democratic Instruments?' *Party Politics*, Vol. 11, No. 4.

53. Ibid.

54. *Madagascar: Diagnostic Trade Integration Study*. 15 August 2003 (<http://www.integratedframework.org/>)

55. <http://www.globalcompetitionforum.org/africa.htm#Madagascar>

56. Kandiero, Tony, 'Malawi in the Multilateral Trading System'. *Managing the Challenges of WTO Participation: Case Study 23* ([http://www.wto.org/english/res\\_e/booksp\\_e/casestudies\\_e/case23\\_e.htm](http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/casestudies_e/case23_e.htm))

57. 'Impact Assessment Study' (2005). Presidential Investors' Advisory Councils in Africa, World Bank.

58. 'Reforming the Business Enabling Environment Mechanisms and Processes for Private-Public Sector Dialogue' (2005). Bangkok Consulting Ltd.

59. 'Malawi: The National Action Group (NAG)'. *International Workshop on Public-Private Dialogue: Case Study 3* (<http://www.publicprivatedialogue.org>).

60. <http://www.globalcompetitionforum.org/africa.htm#Malawi>



## Mali

### The Private Sector

Two primary business associations exist in Mali, the Fédération Nationale des Employeurs du Mali and the Chambre de Commerce et d'Industrie du Mali, representing the employer's association and general business interests, respectively. SME's have had difficulty gaining access to credit and developing a voice within government fora.

### The Public Sector

Mali has an investment promotion agency, Centre National de Promotion des Investissements (CNPI), which was formed in 1996. In 1997, the Malian government founded the Comité National de Co-ordination Économique (CNCE), through which the various ministries interact with the private sector, though its role is ambiguous.<sup>61</sup> More recently, Mali launched a Presidential Investor's Council (CPI, 2004) to promote and interact with the private sector; to date, the CPI has been considered a very positive forum but lacks a sufficient funding base.<sup>62</sup>

### Collusive Behaviour

The government of Mali issued L'Ordonnance No. 92 in April of 1992 to oversee competitive practices.<sup>63</sup> Complaints over government transparency have remained an issue, even within the CPI. Additionally, the bureaucracy within the country is often criticised as being corrupt; the government is split into more than 100 political factions.<sup>64</sup>

### Defining Moments in Malian SBR's since the 1970s

- 1992: Mali issues L'Ordonnance No. 92 for competition policy
- 1996: CNPI created
- 1997: CNCE founded as PPD mechanism
- 2004: CPI formed

## Mauritius

### The Private Sector

Mauritius has deep private sector roots, dating back to 1850 with the founding of the Chamber of Commerce. The Chamber of Commerce re-established itself as the Mauritius Chamber of Commerce and Industry (MCCI) in 1965, and in 1967, the Mauritius Export Processing Zone Association (MEPZA) was formed within the private sector. The primary actor for the private sector within Mauritius is the Joint Economic Council (JEC, 1970);<sup>65</sup> the JEC meets with the prime minister on a regular basis and participates in budget proposals.

JEC<sup>66 67</sup>

The JEC of Mauritius is funded entirely by its members, which include:

- Mauritius Chamber of Commerce and Industry
- Mauritius Chamber of Agriculture
- Mauritius Employers' Federation
- Mauritius Sugar Producers' Association
- Mauritius Export Processing Zone Association
- Mauritius Bankers' Association
- Mauritius Insurers' Association
- Association des Hôteliers et Restaurateurs de l'île Maurice
- Association of Mauritian Manufacturers

The Joint Economic Council is managed by a Council of 18 members, with a Chairman who rotates every two years and a full-time Director. As of 1999, the JEC's top goals are to ensure a stable macro economic environment, foster greater fiscal discipline, restore financial health, and integrate all sectors of the economy in order to reduce distortions and improve efficiency of investment.

### The Public Sector

Mauritius formed an investment promotion agency, Board of Investment (BOI) in 2001 to finance and promote investment throughout the country. The public sector supports Mauritius' key industries such

61. 'Expanding and Diversifying Trade for Growth and Poverty Reduction' (18 November 2004). *Mali: Diagnostic Trade Integration Study* (<http://www.integratedframework.org>).

62. 'Impact Assessment Study' (2005). Presidential Investors' Advisory Councils in Africa, World Bank.

63. <http://www.globalcompetitionforum.org/africa.htm#Mali>

64. 'Impact Assessment Study' (2005). Presidential Investors' Advisory Councils in Africa, World Bank.

65. Stoler, Andrew L. 'Mauritius: Co-operation in an Economy Evolving for the Future'. *Managing the Challenges of WTO Participation: Case Study 26* ([http://www.wto.org/english/res\\_e/booksp\\_e/casestudies\\_e/case26\\_e.htm](http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/casestudies_e/case26_e.htm)).

66. Bräutigam, Deborah; Rakner, Lisa; and Taylor, Scott (2002) 'Business Associations and Growth Coalitions in Sub-Saharan Africa'. *Journal of Modern African Studies*, Vol. 40, No. 4, pp. 519-547.

67. 'JEC: Organisational Set-up of the Mauritius Private Sector' (<http://www.jec-mauritius.org/>).

as sugar, and interaction with the private sector is highly institutionalised through the aforementioned JEC.<sup>68</sup>

### **Collusive Behaviour**

Eliminating corruption is a high priority within the government, as evidenced by the 2002 Prevention of Corruption Act.<sup>69</sup> Mauritius passed The Competition Bill in 2003, but it does not have an institution enabled to uphold its provisions yet.<sup>70</sup>

### **Defining Moments in Mauritian SBR's since the 1970s**

- Pre-1970: MCCI (originally 1850/1965) and MEPZA (1967) founded
- 1970: JEC founded
- 2001: BOI founded
- 2003: Competition Bill passed

## Mozambique

### **The Private Sector**

The primary means of business interaction is the Confederation of Mozambican Business Associations (CTA), founded in 1999 and encompassing more than 3000 firms. All other consultations are ad hoc.<sup>71</sup>

### **The Public Sector**

Mozambique spent years under internal struggle, including a 15 year civil war shortly after its 1975 independence, hindering its economic growth.<sup>72</sup> The Mozambican public sector suffers from poor intergovernmental co-ordination and training, though it is improving. In 1997, Mozambique established an investment promotion center, Centro de Promocao de Investimentos (CPI) and with the help of foreign aid, Mozambique was able to found an annual Private Sector Conference in 1998 within which the Ministry of Industry and Trade interacts with the CTA.<sup>73</sup>

### **Collusive Behaviour**

Mozambique has no current competition policy, but is seeking help in developing one.<sup>74</sup>

### **Defining Moments in Mozambican SBR's since the 1970s**

- 1975: Independence from Portugal
- 1977–1992: Civil War
- 1989: Marxism abandoned
- 1997: CPI established
- 1998: Private Sector Conference established
- 2004: Peaceful governmental transition

## Nigeria

### **The Private Sector**

The largest private sector organisation is the Nigerian Association of Chambers of Commerce, Industry, Mines, and Agriculture (NACCIMA, 1960). Within NACCIMA, the Lagos Chamber of Commerce and Industry (LCCI, 1888) is the oldest and most influential; another long standing private sector venture is the Manufacturing Association of Nigeria (MAN, 1971). NACCIMA and the business associations of Nigeria as a whole enjoy a strong relationship with the government and are seen as very well organised and influential. However, firms outside of NACCIMA and MAN were left with little influence in the governmental sphere.<sup>75</sup>

### **The Public Sector**

The 1972 Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Decree forced nearly all non-Nigerian business owners to sell their businesses. The Nigerian government formed Nigerian Investment Promotion Centre (NIPC) in 1995 to promote investment and act as a liaison for policy advice; a year later, the Nigerian Economic Summit Group (NESG, 1996) was founded as an annual formal PPD mechanism.

### **Collusive Behaviour**

Nigeria has gone through cycles of civil and military rule, finally settling in civilian rule in 1999. Throughout the 1970s, the government often undertook rent-seeking behaviour; Nigeria was very protective of its industry and often shut off potential imports into the country.<sup>76</sup> Between 1980 and 1991, Nigeria was taken to court three times for WTO and GATT violations by the United States, Norway, and

68. Handley, Antoinette, 'Business and the state: economic policymaking in Africa's neo-liberal era'. Working Paper.

69. 2005 Investment Climate Statement – Mauritius (<http://www.state.gov/e/eb/afd/2005/42089.htm>).

70. <http://www.globalcompetitionforum.org/africa.htm#Mauritius>

71. 'Main Report' (2004). *Removing Obstacles to Economic Growth in Mozambique: a Diagnostic Trade Study*, Vol. 2, USAID (<http://www.integratedframework.org/>).

72. <https://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/mz.html>

73. 'Executive Summary and Action Matrix' (2004). *Removing Obstacles to Economic Growth in Mozambique: a Diagnostic Trade Study*, Vol. 1, USAID (<http://www.integratedframework.org/>).

74. <http://www.globalcompetitionforum.org/africa.htm#Mozambique>

75. Kraus, Jon (2002) 'Capital, power and business associations in the African political economy: a tale of two countries, Ghana and Nigeria'. *Journal of Modern African Studies*, Vol. 40, No. 3, pp. 395–436.

76. Lewis, Peter M. (1994) 'Economic statism, private capital and the dilemmas of accumulation in Nigeria'. *World Development*, Vol. 22, No. 3, pp. 437–451.

the Ivory Coast.<sup>77</sup> There are no competition laws currently in place, though efforts are being put in place through legislation.<sup>78</sup>

### **Defining Moments in Nigerian SBR's since the 1970s**

- Pre-1970: NACCIMA founded (1960)
- 1971: MAN founded
- 1972: Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Decree
- 1995: NIPC founded
- 1996: NESG founded
- 1999: Return to civilian rule

## Rwanda

### **The Private Sector**

The primary private sector actor in Rwanda is the Rwanda Private Sector Federation (RPSF), which is a coalition of primarily small business founded in 1999; they help private sector growth but are poorly funded. The private sector has run into problems of power distribution, as the top 13 companies in Rwanda are responsible for 80% of the taxes.<sup>79</sup>

### **The Public Sector**

In 1998, the government formed the Rwandan Investment Promoting Agency (RIPA), but changed its name six years later to Rwanda Investment and Export Promoting Agency (RIEPA, 2004). This semi-autonomous agency has made great strides in working with the private sector and gaining its input on reform measures.<sup>80</sup>

### **Collusive Behaviour**

Rwanda currently has no competition policy in place. Rwanda formerly had problems with government shut down of businesses unable to pay taxes, but the RRA seems to be ahead of its predecessors in terms of limiting collusion and corruption.<sup>81</sup>

### **Defining Moments in Rwandan SBR's since the 1970s**

- 1998: Rwanda starts RIPA
- 1999: Rwandan businesses respond with RPSF
- 2004: RIPA changes name to RIEPA to emphasise investment and exports

## Senegal

### **The Private Sector**

The private sector has two primary business associations, the Conseil Nationale du Patronat (CNP, 1987) and the Confederation Nationales des Employeurs du Senegal (CNES, 1993). In general, the CNP represents big business while the Confederation represents SMEs. Two years after the creation of the CNES, the Co-ordination Patronale du Sénégal (CDPS, 1995) was formed, linking nearly all the unions and professional organisations within the country.<sup>82</sup>

### **The Public Sector**

Senegal's earliest efforts of dialogue with the private sector stemmed from political favours and power exchanges between state agents and businesses.<sup>83</sup> This changed in 1986, when the government adopted the World Bank SAP under the name of the New Industrial Policy, ignoring private sector objections.<sup>84</sup> In 2000, the government introduced the Investment Promotion and Major Works Agency (APIX) to promote investment and shortly thereafter, Senegal launched the Presidential Investor's Council (CPI, 2002), a biannual PPD forum. The CPI has been considered a success; one estimate indicated as many as 70% of laws passed by Parliament were due to CPI efforts.<sup>85</sup>

### **Collusive Behaviour**

Prior to the SAP reforms, state power was used to insert favoured local constituencies. By 1995, Senegal passed the Decree on Price, Competition and Economic Contentious to prevent the commerce industry from colluding;<sup>86</sup> however, more recent anti-corruption laws proposed by CPI, while accepted, have been accused of being 'watered-down' by Parliament.<sup>87</sup>

77. Oyejide, Ademola; Ogunkola, A.; and Bankhole, A., 'Import Prohibition a Trade Policy Instrument: the Nigerian Experience'. *Managing the Challenges of WTO Participation: Case Study 32* ([http://www.wto.org/english/res\\_e/booksp\\_e/casestudies\\_e/case32\\_e.htm](http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/casestudies_e/case32_e.htm)).

78. <http://www.globalcompetitionforum.org/africa.htm#Nigeria>

79. Torero, Eugene; Everest-Phillips, Max; and Stern, Richard, 'Rwanda: The Rwandan Revenue Authority Project'. *International Workshop on Public-Private Dialogue: Case Study 9* (<http://www.publicprivatedialogue.com>).

80. Ibid.

81. Ibid.

82. Daffé, Gaye and Diop, Momar Coumba, *Senegal: Institutional Aspects of trade and Industry Policy*. ([http://www.eepsea.org/fr/ev-71261-201-1-DO\\_TOPIC.html](http://www.eepsea.org/fr/ev-71261-201-1-DO_TOPIC.html)).

83. Boone, Catherine (1994) 'Trade, taxes and tribute: market liberalizations and the new importers in West Africa'. *World Development*, Vol. 22, No. 3, pp. 453-467.

84. Daffé, Gaye and Diop, Momar Coumba, *Senegal: Institutional Aspects of trade and Industry Policy*. ([http://www.eepsea.org/fr/ev-71261-201-1-DO\\_TOPIC.html](http://www.eepsea.org/fr/ev-71261-201-1-DO_TOPIC.html)).

85. 'Impact Assessment Study' (2005). Presidential Investors' Advisory Councils in Africa, World Bank.

86. <http://www.globalcompetitionforum.org/africa.htm#Senegal>

87. 'Impact Assessment Study' (2005). Presidential Investors' Advisory Councils in Africa, World Bank.

### Defining Moments in Senegal SBR's since the 1970s

- Mid 1980s: Senegal undergoes Structural Adjustment Program
- 1986–1988: New Industrial Policy experiment
- 1987: CNP formed
- 1993: CNES formed
- 1995: CDPS formed
- 1995: Senegal passes competition laws
- 2000: Government forms APIX, investment promotion agency
- 2002: CPI formed, President meets with private sector regularly

## South Africa

### The Private Sector

The private sector has historically been dominated by big business – in 1995, five business groups owned 70% of the Johannesburg Stock Exchange.<sup>88</sup> Both small and large firms have representation; the small firms collaborate through the South African Chamber of Businesses (1990), whereas big business operates under the Business Leadership lobby, formerly South African Foundation, founded in 1959. 'Big business' also formed the Business Trust in 1999, an endeavour aimed to further government and business relations by pledging significant amounts of money to the areas of education and job creation. The private sector communicates with the public sector through NEDLAC, a formal PPD institution.

#### NEDLAC<sup>89</sup>

NEDLAC has four constituencies that meet to discuss and form consensus on social and economic policy:

- 1) The Government: Departments of Labour, Finance, Public Works and Trade and Industry;
- 2) Organized Business: Under the umbrella of Business South Africa (BSA) and the National African Federated Chamber of Commerce (Nafcoc);
- 3) Organized Labour: Under the umbrella of the Congress of South African Trade Unions (Cosatu), the National Council of Trade Unions (Nactu) and the Federation of Unions in South Africa (Fedusa);
- 4) The Community: South African Youth Council, National Women's Coalition, South African National Civics Organization, Disabled People of South Africa, and the National Co-operatives Association of South Africa.

All agreements and findings under NEDLAC are made public and tabled in Parliament. The NEDLAC Annual Summit brings together delegates representing over 300 constituencies.

### The Public Sector

Labour in South Africa is particularly strong; the Congress of South African Trade Unions (1985) is the second strongest partner in the post-apartheid, tripartite government. The government has long-standing ties dating to 1988, when the Consultative Business Movement (CBM) met with the currently empowered African National Congress, led by Nelson Mandela. After a false start with the National Economic Forum (1992), the 1994 National Economic Development and Labour Council (NEDLAC) succeeded the NEF as a lasting, formal PPD institution. South Africa also has several investment promotion agencies, including Invest North West (1973), Trade and Investment KwaZulu-Natal, and Trade and Investment Limpopo.

### Collusive Behaviour

The aforementioned early state-government relations and high concentration of power casts suspicion on big business; additionally, apartheid (first democratic elections – 1994) clearly affected some potential business owners. However, competition rules have been in place for a significant period of time (1979, then recreated 1998, amended 2000). The latter pair of competition regulations have proven effective immediately upon implementation,<sup>90</sup> while the tripartite government keeps governmental interests constantly in check.

### Defining Moments in South African SBR's since the 1970s

- 1988: CBM meets with ANC
- 1992: NEF founded
- 1994: NEF replaced by NEDLAC
- 1994: Nelson Mandela elected, apartheid ended
- 1997: Truth and Reconciliations Committee attacks business, damages SBR<sup>91</sup>

88. Handley, Antoinette (2005) 'Business, government and economic policymaking in the new South Africa, 1990–2000'. *Journal of Modern African Studies*, Vol. 23, pp. 211–239.

89. About NEDLAC: structure (<http://www.nedlac.org.za/>).

90. <http://www.globalcompetitionforum.org/africa.htm#safrica>

91. Handley, Antoinette (2005) 'Business, government and economic policymaking in the new South Africa, 1990–2000'. *Journal of Modern African Studies*, Vol. 23, pp. 211–239.

- 1999: Business Trust initiative revives SBR
- 1999: Thabo Mbeki takes over for Mandela without incident

## Tanzania

### The Private Sector

The leading business association in Tanzania is the Tanzania Chamber of Commerce and Industry Association (TCCIA, 1988), which it often represents business interests in local constituencies. Additionally, the CEO Roundtable is an informal association of around 20 leading CEOs who now meet with the president on an annual basis. More recently, the Tanzania Private Sector Foundation was established as a branch to help companies reach consensus on private sector issues;<sup>92</sup> the private sector is troubled by both a lack of local involvement either directly with the government or within industries.<sup>93</sup>

### The Public Sector

Tanzania has founded two investment promotion agencies, the Zanzibar Investment Promotion Agency (ZIPA, 1986) and the Tanzania Investment Centre (TIC, 1997), the latter being established to be the primary agency on Tanzanian investment. Tanzanian National Business Council (TNBC, 2001) was created through a presidential order in an effort to bring private sector interests into public policy through a formal institution. Just one year later, the president added the Investors' Roundtable under the TNBC's umbrella.

### Collusive Behaviour

Local businesses were sceptical of government intentions and suspicious of the secretive nature of the IRT, and were allowed to create a Local IRT. The Local IRT met once and failed due to individual interests taking precedence over community interests.<sup>94</sup> The Tanzanian government passed The Fair Trade Practices Act in 2003 to protect consumers from unfair pricing.<sup>95</sup>

### Defining Moments in Tanzanian SBR's since the 1970s

- 1986: ZIPA formed
- 1997: TIC created
- 2001: TNBC announced and formed by president
- 2002: IRT meets for the first time

## Uganda

### The Private Sector

The private sector is dominated by the Ugandan Manufacturers' Association (UMA), which was re-established 1988 after previously being established in the 1960s. The Economic Council, which includes heads of many private sector industries is seen as an ineffective actor in policy decisions,<sup>96</sup> but the Private Sector Foundation Uganda (PSFU, 1995) was formed to serve as an umbrella for private sector interests and support their improvement. The primary mechanism for PPD is the National Forum (1992), which was a private sector initiative with government co-operation. The private sector has no formal meetings with the president, but there is legislation which would potentially formalise the National Forum's status.<sup>97</sup>

### The Public Sector

Uganda has an investment promotion agency, the Uganda Investment Authority (1991). While the government participates in the National Forum, the forum is not under the government control, but was supported by the President Museveni at its founding.<sup>98</sup> The Presidential Investors' Roundtable (PIRT) was formed in 2004, by the President, as a task force for policy advice from experts and the private sector.<sup>99</sup>

### Collusive Behaviour

Uganda has no regime governing competition laws,<sup>100</sup> however, the Investment Code does protect both foreign and domestic investors. Uganda suffers from disproportionate political strength for its largest actors, like the UMA, which hurts the country's overall growth prospects.<sup>101</sup>

### Defining Moments in Ugandan SBR's since the 1970s

- 1986: Museveni takes power
- 1988: Uganda Manufacturers' Association re-established after decade of dormancy
- 1992: Private sector initiates government with National Forum
- 1995: Private sector organises with Private Sector Foundation Uganda

92. Charles, Kathleen (2005) *National AGOA Strategy Report for Tanzania* (<http://www.ecatradehub.com/reports/re.2001.01.national.agoa.strategy.tanzania01.asp>).

93. 'Impact Assessment Study' (2005). Presidential Investors' Advisory Councils in Africa, World Bank.

94. Ibid.

95. <http://www.globalcompetitionforum.org/africa.htm#Tanzania>

96. 'Impact Assessment Study' (2005). Presidential Investors' Advisory Councils in Africa, World Bank.

97. 'Investment Policy Review: Uganda'. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (2000).

98. 'Participation, Consultation and Economic Reform in Africa: Economic Fora and the EG-DG Nexus' (2001). *Occasional Paper Series*, Centre for Democracy and Governance – Bureau for Global Programmes, Field Support and Research, US Agency for International Development.

99. Ibid.

100. <http://www.globalcompetitionforum.org/africa.htm#Uganda>

101. Kalema, William (2005) 'Private-Public Sector Dialogue in Uganda's Reform Process' (<http://www1.worldbank.org/deoutreach/mar05/article.asp?id=281>).

- 2000: Government adopts Regulatory Best Practices initiative
- 2004: Museveni creates Presidential Investors' Roundtable to recognise private sector interests.

## Zambia

### The Private Sector

The Zambian Business Forum (ZBF), a group of the 5 main business associations in Zambia, was formed in late 2002; at its first scheduled meeting in 2003, the ZBF degenerated early into private interests.<sup>102</sup> The ZBF remains the only significant private sector mechanism.

### The Public Sector

The Zambian Parliament formed the Zambian Investment Centre in 1991 to attract investment. The Tripartite Consultative Labour Council (TCLC) was established two years later in 1993 by government, as a forum for labour, business, and government though its efforts were unsuccessful.<sup>103</sup> The government of Zambia utilises the Zambia International Business Advisory Council (ZIBAC, 2003) to provide the president with impartial advice. The Private Sector Development Forum (PSDF, 2004) was formed out of private sector suspicion of closed door meetings between ZIBAC and the president, the PSDF facilitates discussion between the ZBF and the president as well as ZIBAC.<sup>104</sup>

### Collusive Behaviour

The Competition and Fair Trading Act was enacted in 1994 and oversees price-fixing, monopolistic, and other non competitive behaviour.<sup>105</sup> Corruption is seen as a major problem in Zambian government; the Zambian government has formed an Anti-Corruption Commission to weed it out. Results are limited; as recently as 2003 the information secretary announced, 'Corruption in Zambia has spread like cancer infecting the whole body'.<sup>106</sup> ZIBAC is criticised for lacking transparency.

### Defining Moments in Zambian SBR's since the 1970s

- 1991: ZIC founded to attract investment
- 1993: TCLC formed
- 1994: Competition and Fair Trading Act
- 2002: Five business associations join to form ZBF
- Early 2003: President meets with ZBF
- Late 2003: President forms ZIBAC
- 2004: PSD Forum links ZBF, President, and ZIBAC

## Zimbabwe

### The Private Sector

The Zimbabwean labour unions have significant power, as the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU, 1981) is now the main political opposition. Business in Zimbabwe joined forces with labour and created the National Economic Consultative Forum (NECF, 1997) and then later the Tripartite Negotiating Forum (TNF) as an offshoot. With Zimbabwe facing economic crisis, the private sector has been urged to take advantage of negotiated trade agreements, having faced accusations of failing to do so in the past.<sup>107</sup>

### The Public Sector

Zimbabwe has one investment promotion agency, the Zimbabwe Investment Centre (ZIC, 1993); among its functions is advising the government on policies relating to the private sector. Both the NECF and TNF were sponsored by the government in 1997, but analysis in 2001 deemed the institutions 'politically tainted' and 'rendered useless'.<sup>108</sup> The government is starting to interact with the private sector again through a Zimbabwe Economic Development Strategy (ZEDS, 2006) – this strategy being a medium term economic blueprint for the country.<sup>109</sup>

### Collusive Behaviour

Zimbabwe created the Competition Act in 1996, lowering its internal protection;<sup>110</sup> also in 1996, due to economic faltering, increasing pressure was placed on an administration seen as corrupt and

102. 'Reforming the Business Enabling Environment Mechanisms and Processes for Private-Public Sector Dialogue' (2005). Bancock Consulting Ltd.

103. 'Participation, Consultation and Economic Reform in Africa: Economic Fora and the EG-DG Nexus' (2001). *Occasional Paper Series*, Centre for Democracy and Governance – Bureau for Global Programmes, Field Support and Research, US Agency for International Development.

104. 'Reforming the Business Enabling Environment Mechanisms and Processes for Private-Public Sector Dialogue' (2005). Bancock Consulting Ltd.

105. <http://www.globalcompetitionforum.org/africa.htm#Zambia>

106. 'Zambia Drivers of Pro-Poor Change: an Overview'. Full-length version ([http://www.sarpn.org.za/documents/d0000332/P312\\_Zambia\\_Full\\_version.pdf](http://www.sarpn.org.za/documents/d0000332/P312_Zambia_Full_version.pdf)).

107. 'Zimbabwean private sector urged to exploit bilateral trade agreements' *Xinhua General News Service*, 20 July 2006.

108. 'Participation, Consultation and Economic Reform in Africa: Economic Fora and the EG-DG Nexus' (2001). *Occasional Paper Series*, Centre for Democracy and Governance – Bureau for Global Programmes, Field Support and Research, US Agency for International Development.

109. 'Zimbabwe; state, private sector working on new economic blueprint' *All Africa News Inc.*, 5 July 2006.

110. <http://www.globalcompetitionforum.org/africa.htm#Zimbabwe>

ineffective.<sup>111</sup> Critics argue the government interaction with the NECF and TNF is more controlling than consultative; agreements reached through the TNF are put in action directly by the executive, undermining any parliamentary power.<sup>112</sup>

**Defining Moments in Zimbabwean SBR's since the 1970s**

- 1981: ZCTU re-formed
- 1993: ZIC founded
- 1996: Competition Act welcomes market-based economics
- 1997: NECF formed

111. 'Participation, Consultation and Economic Reform in Africa: Economic Fora and the EG-DG Nexus' (2001). *Occasional Paper Series*, Centre for Democracy and Governance – Bureau for Global Programmes, Field Support and Research, US Agency for International Development.

112. Ibid.

# Appendix C

## ASSOCIATIONS AND ACRONYMS WITH WEB ADDRESSES

### Benin:

Centre de Promotion des Investissements (CPI): <http://www.cpi-benin.org>  
 Chambre de Commerce et d'Industrie du Benin (CCIB): <http://www.ccib.bj/>  
 Ministère de l'Industrie, du Commerce et de la Promotion de l'Emploi (MICPE):  
<http://www.gouv.bj/en/ministeres/micpe/>

### Botswana:

Botswana Export Development and Investment Authority (BEDIA): <http://www.bedia.co.bw>  
 Ministry of Trade and Industry (MTI): <http://www.mti.gov.bw/>  
 Exporters' Association of Botswana (EAOB): <http://www.exporters.bw/>  
 The Botswana Confederation of Commerce, Industry and Manpower (BOCCIM):  
<http://www.boccim.co.bw/>  
 Botswana Federation of Trade Unions (BFTU): No website  
 High Level Consultative Council (HLCC): No website

### Côte d'Ivoire (Ivory Coast):

Centre de Promotion des Investissements en Côte d'Ivoire (CEPICI): <http://www.cepici.net>

### Ethiopia:

Ethiopian Investment Commission (EIC): <http://www.investethiopia.org/default.aspx>  
 Ethiopian Chamber of Commerce (ECC): <http://www.ethiopianchamber.com/>

### Ghana:

Ghana Investment Promotions Centre (GIPC): <http://www.gipc.org.gh/>  
 Ghana Investors' Advisory Council (GIAC): <http://www.giacghana.org/>  
 National Economic Forum (NEF): No website  
 Private Enterprise Foundation (PEF): <http://www.pefghana.org/>  
 Ghana Export Promotion Council (GEPC): <http://www.gepcghana.com/>

### Kenya:

Export Processing Zones Authority (EPZA): <http://www.epzakenya.com>  
 Investment Promotion Centre (KIA): <http://www.investmentkenya.com/>  
 Kenya National Chamber of Commerce and Industry (KNCCI): <http://www.kncci.org>  
 National Committee on WTO (NCWTO): No website

### Malawi:

Malawi Investment Promotion Agency (MIPA): <http://www.mipa.malawi.net> (dead link)  
 Malawi Chamber of Commerce and Industry (MCCI): <http://www.mccci.org/index.asp>  
 Ministry for Trade and Development: <http://www.malawi.gov.mw/Trade/Home%20%20Trade.htm>  
 National Action Group (NAG): No website  
 Malawi Economic Growth Strategy: No website

### Mali:

Centre National de Promotion des Investissements (CNPI): <http://www.cnpi-mali.org>  
 Fédération Nationale des Employeurs du Mali (FNEM): No website  
 Chambre de Commerce et d'Industrie du Mali (CCIM): No website  
 Comité National de Co-ordination Économique (CNCE): No website

### Mauritius:

Board of Investment of Mauritius (BOIM): <http://www.boimauritius.com>  
 Export Processing Zone Development Authority (EPZDA): <http://epzda.intnet.mu/>  
 Mauritius Export Processing Zone Authority (MEPZA): <http://www.mepza.org/index.asp>  
 Joint Economic Council (JEC): <http://www.jec-mauritius.org/>

### Mozambique:

Centro de Promocao de Investimentos (CPI): <http://www.cpi.co.mz>  
 Confederation of Mozambican Business Associations (CTA): <http://www.cta.co.mz>

### Nigeria:

Nigerian Investment Promotion Commission (NIPC): <http://www.nipc-nigeria.org>



Nigerian Economic Summit Group (NESG): <http://www.nesgroup.org/>  
 Nigerian Association of Chambers of Commerce, Industry, Mines, and Agriculture (NACCIMA):  
<http://www.naccima.com/>  
 Manufacturing Association of Nigeria (MAN): <http://www.manufacturersnigeria.org/>  
 Lagos Chamber of Commerce (LCCI): <http://www.lagoschamber.com/>

#### **Rwanda:**

Rwanda Investment and Export Promoting Agency (RIEPA): <http://www.rwandainvest.com>  
 Rwanda Private Sector Federation (RPSF): No website  
 Rwanda Revenue Authority (RRA): <http://www.rra.gov.rw/>

#### **Senegal:**

Investment Promotion and Major Works Agency (APIX): <http://www.apix.sn>  
 Conseil Nationale du Patronat (CNP): <http://www.cnp.sn/>  
 Confederation Nationales des Employeurs du Senegal (CNES): <http://www.cnes.sn/>  
 Co-ordination Patronale du Sénégal (CDPS): No website

#### **South Africa:**

Business Leadership (BL, formerly SAF - South African Foundation):  
<http://www.businessleadership.org.za/>  
 South African Chamber of Business (SACOB): <http://www.sacob.co.za/>  
 Business Trust (BT): <http://www.btrust.org.za/index.aspx>  
 Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU): <http://www.cosatu.org.za/>  
 Invest North West (INW): <http://www.inw.org.za>  
 Trade and Investment KwaZulu-Natal (TIKZN): <http://www.tikzn.co.za/>  
 Trade and Investment Limpopo (TIL): <http://www.til.co.za/>  
 National Economic Development and Labour Council (NEDLAC): <http://www.nedlac.org.za/>

#### **Tanzania:**

Zanzibar Investment Promotion Agency (ZIPA): <http://www.investzanzibar.org>  
 Tanzania Investment Centre (TIC): <http://www.tic.co.tz>  
 Tanzania Chamber of Commerce and Industry Association (TCCIA): <http://www.tccia.co.tz/>  
 Tanzania National Business Council (TNBC): <http://www.tnbctz.com/>  
 Investors' Round Table (IRT): <http://www.tnbctz.com/irt.htm>

#### **Uganda:**

Uganda Investment Authority (UIA): <http://www.ugandainvest.com>  
 Uganda Manufacturers' Association (UMA): <http://www.uma.or.ug/htdocs/>  
 Private Sector Foundation Uganda (PSF Uganda): <http://www.psfuganda.org/>  
 Presidential Investor's Roundtable (PIRT): No website  
 National Forum (NF): No website

#### **Zambia:**

Zambia Investment Centre (ZIC): <http://www.zic.org.zm>  
 Zambia International Business Advisory Council (ZIBAC): No website  
 Tripartite Consultative Labour Council (TCLC): No website  
 Zambia International Business Advisory Council (ZIBAC): No website  
 Zambia Business Forum (ZBF): No website

#### **Zimbabwe:**

Zimbabwe Investment Centre (ZIC): <http://www.zic.co.zw>  
 Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU): <http://www.zctu.co.zw/>  
 National Economic Consultative Forum (NECF): <http://www.necf.org.zw/>

## Appendix D

## COUNTRY SPECIFIC DATA FOR THE SBR VARIABLE

	Benin	Botswana	Côte d'Ivoire	Eritrea	Ethiopia	Ghana	Kenya	Madagascar	Malawi	Mali	Mauritius	Mozambique	Nigeria	Rwanda
1970	0.25	0	0	0	0	0	0.25	0	0	0	0.5	0	0	0
1971	0.25	0	0	0	0	0	0.25	0	0	0	0.5	0	0	0
1972	0.25	0	0	0	0	0	0.25	0	0	0	0.5	0	0	0
1973	0.25	0	0	0	0	0	0.25	0	0	0	0.5	0	0	0
1974	0.25	0	0	0	0	0	0.25	0	0	0	0.5	0	0	0
1975	0.25	0	0	0	0	0	0.25	0	0	0	0.5	0	0	0
1976	0.25	0	0	0	0	0	0.25	0	0	0	0.5	0	0	0
1977	0.25	0.25	0	0	0	0	0.25	0	0	0	0.5	0	0	0
1978	0.25	0.25	0	0	0	0	0.25	0	0	0	0.5	0	0	0
1979	0.25	0.25	0	0	0	0	0.25	0	0	0	0.5	0	0	0
1980	0.25	0.25	0	0	0	0	0.25	0	0	0	0.5	0	0	0
1981	0.25	0.25	0	0	0	0	0.25	0	0	0	0.5	0	0	0
1982	0.25	0.25	0	0	0	0	0.25	0	0	0	0.5	0	0	0
1983	0.25	0.25	0	0	0	0	0.25	0	0	0	0.5	0	0	0
1984	0.25	0.25	0	0	0	0	0.25	0	0	0	0.5	0	0	0
1985	0.25	0.25	0	0	0	0	0.25	0	0	0	0.5	0	0	0
1986	0.25	0.25	0	0	0	0	0.25	0	0	0	0.5	0	0	0
1987	0.25	0.25	0	0	0	0	0.25	0	0	0	0.5	0	0	0
1988	0.25	0.25	0	0	0	0	0.25	0	0	0	0.5	0	0	0
1989	0.25	0.25	0	0	0	0	0.5	0	0	0	0.5	0	0	0
1990	0.25	0.25	0	0	0	0	0.5	0	0	0	0.5	0	0	0
1991	0.25	0.25	0	0	0	0	0.5	0	0.25	0	0.5	0	0	0
1992	0.25	0.25	0	0	0.25	0	0.5	0	0.25	0	0.5	0	0	0
1993	0.25	0.25	0.25	0	0.25	0	0.5	0	0.25	0	0.5	0	0	0
1994	0.25	0.25	0.25	0	0.25	0.5	0.5	0	0.25	0	0.5	0	0	0
1995	0.25	0.25	0.25	0	0.25	0.5	0.5	0	0.25	0	0.5	0	0	0
1996	0.5	0.625	0.25	0	0.25	0.5	0.625	0	0.25	0	0.5	0	0.25	0
1997	0.5	0.875	0.375	0	0.25	0.5	0.625	0	0.25	0.25	0.5	0	0.375	0
1998	0.5	0.875	0.375	0	0.25	0.5	0.625	0	0.375	0.5	0.5	0.25	0.375	0.25
1999	0.5	0.875	0.375	0	0.25	0.5	0.625	0	0.375	0.625	0.5	0.625	0.375	0.5
2000	0.5	0.875	0.375	0	0.25	0.5	0.625	0	0.625	0.625	0.5	0.625	0.375	0.5
2001	0.5	0.875	0.375	0	0.25	0.75	0.625	0	0.875	0.625	0.75	0.625	0.375	0.5
2002	0.5	0.875	0.375	0	0.625	0.75	0.625	0	0.875	0.625	0.75	0.625	0.375	0.5
2003	0.5	0.875	0.375	0	0.625	0.75	0.625	0	0.875	0.625	0.875	0.625	0.375	0.5
2004	0.5	0.875	0.375	0	0.625	0.75	0.875	0	0.875	0.625	0.875	0.625	0.375	0.5
2005	0.5	0.875	0.375	0	0.625	0.75	0.875	0	0.875	0.625	0.875	0.625	0.375	0.5

	Senegal	South Africa	Tanzania	Uganda	Zambia	Zimbabwe
1970	0	0.25	0	0	0	0
1971	0	0.25	0	0	0	0
1972	0	0.25	0	0	0	0
1973	0	0.5	0	0	0	0
1974	0	0.5	0	0	0	0
1975	0	0.5	0	0	0	0
1976	0	0.5	0	0	0	0
1977	0	0.5	0	0	0	0
1978	0	0.5	0	0	0	0
1979	0	0.625	0	0	0	0
1980	0	0.625	0	0	0	0
1981	0	0.625	0	0	0	0
1982	0	0.625	0	0	0	0
1983	0	0.625	0	0	0	0
1984	0	0.625	0	0	0	0
1985	0	0.625	0	0	0	0
1986	0	0.625	0.25	0	0	0
1987	0	0.625	0.25	0	0	0
1988	0	0.625	0.25	0	0	0
1989	0	0.625	0.25	0	0	0
1990	0	0.625	0.25	0	0	0
1991	0	0.625	0.25	0.25	0.25	0
1992	0	0.625	0.25	0.375	0.25	0
1993	0	0.625	0.25	0.375	0.25	0.25
1994	0	0.875	0.25	0.375	0.375	0.25
1995	0.375	0.875	0.25	0.625	0.375	0.375
1996	0.375	0.875	0.25	0.625	0.375	0.625
1997	0.375	0.875	0.25	0.625	0.375	0.625
1998	0.375	1	0.25	0.625	0.375	0.625
1999	0.375	1	0.25	0.625	0.375	0.625
2000	0.625	1	0.5	0.625	0.375	0.625
2001	0.625	1	0.625	0.625	0.375	0.625
2002	0.875	1	0.625	0.625	0.375	0.625
2003	0.875	1	0.75	0.625	0.625	0.625
2004	0.875	1	0.75	0.625	0.875	0.625
2005	0.875	1	0.75	0.625	0.875	0.625